Impact of information acquisition costs on voting choices : an experimental study on information acquisition and ideological distances by Järvi, Theodora
 
 
 
  
 
Impact of Information 
Acquisition Costs on Voting 
Choices 
An experimental study on information 
acquisition and ideological distances 
Master’s Thesis 
Theodora Järvi 
Master’s Degree Programme in 
Public Choice 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
University of Tampere 
May 2018 
Master’s thesis title: Impact of Information Acquisition Costs on Voting Choices. An 
experimental study on information acquisition and ideological distances 
Date: May 2018 
Author: Theodora Järvi 
Supervisor: Prof. Katri Sieberg 
Pages: Thesis - 70 pages, Appendices – 16 pages 
 
Abstract  
Individual decision-making and its applications have been of scientific interest for a long time. 
Decision-making is central to behaviour and can have multiple stages and contexts. This thesis 
looks at voting behaviour with a focus on the very initial stages of choice-making. The aim is 
to investigate how influential information acquisition and the related costs are to a personally 
rational decision – one in which the individual chooses a representative for themselves that 
best complements their ideological views. This thesis takes the unique viewpoint of a 
multiparty setting and adapts mathematical models to quantify the different variables 
associated with voting choices. To build a fuller representation of how these information 
acquisition costs influence choices, a pilot laboratory experiment is conducted. The results 
obtained suggest that information acquisition is highly influential to the outcomes of voting 
and needs to be well balanced, as information enhances the gains from voting, but the costs 
from acquiring information can have a negative impact on the outcome. Additionally, it is 
found that the initial information an individual possesses guides their further desire to look for 
information. This study concludes that there seems to be a need to study the issue further to 
better understand how decisions are made in a multiparty system and how information affects 
these decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
Voting behaviour has long been of interest to researchers. Already in 1959 Lipset looked at 
how voters made “rational electoral choices” (Lipset, 1959, p.79). In the words of Markus and 
Converse (1979, p. 1056) “(r)ationality refers to the notion of minimizing expected loss”, 
where in a voting context loss is stated to be either of personal or policy-related character. 
Nowadays it is presumed people make these kinds of rational choices because we live in an era 
where there is easy access to an abundance of information. A wide spread of research (for 
example Larcinese (2007), Strömbäck (2008)) has investigated how different outlets present 
information about candidates, especially in election times. Some (such as Larcinese (2009), 
Triossi (2013)) have studied how people strategize their vote in order to gain the most out of 
voting. Additionally, the literature on voter turnout is extensive (Gallego, 2010; Citrin, 
Schickler & Sides, 2003; Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009; among others). However, not so much 
attention has been paid to the very early stages of voter decision-making – the one in which the 
voter decides whether they are interested in knowing something about the candidate they would 
choose or whether they are interested in voting at all. Moreover, the majority of voting research 
has concentrated on the dual-party system, mainly in the context of the United States of 
America or Great Britain (e.g. Dalton, 2008; Gallego, 2010; Citrin, et al., 2003; Hillygus, 2005; 
Jessee, 2010; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Larcinese, 2007). 
 
This thesis concentrates on the initial stage of voting, the one before going to the polling station 
or even before the formation of a voting strategy. It aims to take information acquisition and 
the related costs – the non-monetary costs of time and effort when looking for and processing 
information about candidates, policies and current performance of the government - as the main 
variables driving any initial decision-making process and investigate the influence of 
information acquisition and the related costs on the rationality of voting. It should be noted that 
for the purposes of this thesis correct voting choices will be assumed to be economically and 
ideologically rational choices.  
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to investigate whether voters in general try to inform themselves 
better, so they can make a more informed choice or whether there is a certain point after which 
information acquisition costs become unnecessary high. Deriving from the above definition of 
rationality, if the costs would exceed a threshold, where information acquisition becomes too 
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costly in relation to the gains, and no more information is acquired, this could potentially leave 
the individual without information about an ideologically suitable candidate who would better 
represent their interests in policy decision-making.  
 
Another aim of the study is to investigate the rational voting choice in the multiparty context 
(such as the Finnish case). There is a need to choose a context in order to be able to put the 
issue of information acquisition in a more relatable setting and to be able to calculate the related 
costs. Another reason for choosing this type of a system is that it is beneficial to investigate 
information acquisition in a more multifaceted environment where there is more information 
available. In this case also more information is required for adequate decision-making, and in 
a multiparty setting there are different incentives to look for information, as opposed to the 
much studied dual-system.  
 
To be able to quantify the information acquisition costs, a mathematical model is devised to 
capture measurable variables that would affect the gains and define the optimal points of voting 
for a certain candidate. As these costs come solely from looking for information (not voting 
itself, which is not considered in this thesis) they seem to contribute a large amount to the 
outcome of the economically beneficial voting equation, in which the individual gets the 
maximum amount of personal gains from their choice of candidate. Furthermore, an 
experiment is used to test the mathematical model and give empirical evidence on consistency 
of actual behaviour with the model. More specifically, the experiment aims to show when and 
why individuals feel a need to look for information. Additionally, thresholds of information 
and individual dependencies for these thresholds are investigated both in the model and in the 
pilot experiment. 
 
The pilot experiment seeks to answer the research question of this thesis and find what impact 
information and the costs of its acquisition can have on the rational voting choice. The choice 
in the voting situation for participants is to select the appropriate amount of information and 
then vote for their preferred candidate. The participants’ payoffs from voting depend on the 
amount of information purchased and the distance to their chosen candidate. The payoff in the 
experiment serves as a utility maximization measure, through which the effect of information 
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acquisition costs to the final utility can be measured. According to Gallego, Schofield, 
McAlister & Jeon (2014) the utility of the voter results from their ideological or policy distance 
from the candidate, as well as from other preferential considerations.  
 
From the analysis of the experiment results it is seen that information ha a positive influence 
on the voting choice, whereas the costs can have a negative impact on voting if they become 
too big in comparison to the gains from voting. Therefore, thresholds are an important 
consideration with rational voting choices. These thresholds have a theoretical grounding in 
probabilities but are also highly dependent on the individual characteristics of the voter. 
Moreover, the already (freely) available information can have an impact on whether the voter 
decides to pay costs for acquiring more information. Although not conclusive, these results 
show that the impact of information acquisition and the related costs on rational voting choices 
need to be studied further in a multiparty system. 
 
The thesis begins with a description of the idea and pinpoints the research questions. The next 
chapter reviews the existing literature and helps further characterize the topic and its relevance 
to previous research. The fourth chapter takes the previous research and outlines the hypothesis 
answering the research questions. The fifth chapter describes the assumptions made and the 
mathematical model used as a basis for the experiment. The sixth chapter presents the design 
of the experiment. The seventh chapter is devoted to the predicted outcomes of the experiment. 
The eight chapter describes the findings of the pilot experiment. The ninth chapter generally 
describes these results in relation to the hypothesis stated and suggests future developments of 
the research. The thesis ends with a conclusions-section which highlights the main points and 
results in the study. In appendices, supplementary materials on the experiment can be found. 
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2.  Research idea and research questions 
2.1.Research field 
Voting is seen in the literature as either a citizen duty (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Ha and 
Lau, 2015) or as a possibility to impact governing (Downs, 1957). Dalton (2008) goes even as 
far as saying that citizen participation through voting is the very basis of democracy in the 
American context, as it constitutes a behavioural norm. Ostrom (1998) sees voting as collective 
action problem, as in it individuals make independent decisions for a collective outcome. As 
part of a democratic society, voting is also seen as a way of self- expression. Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005, p.151) state that the individuals become more autonomous in their information 
as the access to education and information increases. 
 
From here it can be seen that voting has a key role in society as an empowering and controlling 
(from the side of the citizenry) function. Therefore, it can be argued that it is beneficial to 
investigate what motivates the individual to cast their vote for a party or a candidate. 
Additionally, finding out how these motivators are connected, and which are the most powerful 
of these motivators can help us understand not only electoral results, but also behavioural 
influences in voting. As already outlined in the introduction, the idea of this thesis is to 
investigate the initial steps of the decision-making process in a voting situation. A more 
detailed description of the scope can be found in the assumptions-section of the model-chapter.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the optimality of voting choices. As this subject can be 
viewed from different perspectives, it is important to identify that the approach in this case is 
to investigate how the optimality of the voter’s choice is related to the information acquisition 
costs incurring from the choice process. The optimality or rationality, maximizing one’s gains 
while minimizing losses, of that choice here will be assumed to be the same as maximizing the 
voter’s utility. This will also help in defining the costs of information acquisition as they will 
factor into the utility maximization equation.  
 
As mentioned earlier, there seems to be an oversaturation in the studies of voter turnout in 
political research. Therefore, this thesis will not take the turnout into consideration but rather 
focus on the choice making process. Additionally, most of the literature is focused on two-
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dimensional or two-party systems, especially the American case. To differentiate this research 
from the rest, the context of a multiparty system is investigated. An example of such a system 
would be Finland, which according to the Elections website of the Ministry of Justice (vaalit.fi, 
2017) has 17 registered political parties in Finland. This presents a more varied choice setting, 
but also presents a demand for more information. 
 
To be able to measure the impact information acquisition and its costs have on the voting 
choice, a quantitative approach is taken. The mathematical model in this thesis is built around 
utility maximization. The main variables influencing the cost are the individual skill of the 
voter (which features education and inherent abilities, among others), as well as the amount of 
information acquired. The main considerations of the utility function will be the state of the 
world, the quality of information and the overall interest in the state of the world. As can be 
seen, the state of the world is of crucial importance in this equation. In this thesis the state of 
the world will refer to the current political situation – both in terms of current governance and 
topical issues in policy considerations.  
 
The interest in the state of the world speaks to the willingness to acquire information to find 
the ideologically best suited candidate to match the desired state, be it to keep the current one 
or alter it. It has been pointed out in the literature (Triossi ,2013; Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009) 
that it is difficult to know exactly the state of the world and therefore voters must rely on signals 
coming through the information they receive. Which in turn leads to the importance of the 
amount and quality of information one acquires. As there is no certainty of quality, both the 
state of the world and the quality of information should be considered in terms of probabilities. 
There are also many variables that are difficult to quantify but that do factor in the interest in 
the state of the world. Some of these are the notions of ideology, partisanship and normative 
behaviour. The model and the variables in it will be discussed in more detail in the Model-
chapter of this thesis. 
 
2.2.Research questions  
In order to gain a better understanding of the scope of the thesis and of the aims, it is important 
to identify the research questions this thesis seeks to answer. They are as follows: 
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Research question:  
How do information acquisition and the related costs influence rational voting choices 
in a multiparty setting? 
 
Sub questions to the research question: 
1) How influential are the information acquisition costs to the utility from the voting 
choice? 
2) What amount of information is “enough” in order to maximize one’s utility? Is there a 
difference in thresholds? 
3) Does readily available information influence the willingness to acquire more 
information? 
 
The next chapters aim to answer the posed research questions and test the stated hypothesis 
through a mathematical model and a pilot experiment. However, first, an overview of the 
related literature is given to back the hypothesis and further define the research area. 
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3. Literature review 
This chapter gives a review of the previous literature on the topic of voting behaviour and the 
information acquisition related to it. To more fully clarify the theory behind the thesis idea, 
first an overview of voting research is given. As it is important to define the terms and concepts 
used, a more detailed review on the existing findings on voting behaviour, correct voting and 
all the elements related to voting behaviour are considered in detail. 
 
3.1.Voting research 
As already stated, the interest in voting behaviour has been extensive and can be traced back 
to the 1950s. One of the first, and most influential names in voting behaviour research is 
Anthony Downs. In his paper “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”, 
Downs (1957) looks at democracies and role of governments. A large part of the publication is 
devoted to the voter and the amount of information he possesses. It is stated (p.138) that the 
presumption for a rational actor is to vote in such a way that a government, which is most 
beneficial to them in terms of policies, is elected. (Downs, 1957.) This outlines the same 
interest that Lipset had in 1959 – the rationality of the voter and their choice of a representing 
candidate or party. Since then there has been a lot of attention given to both rationality and 
correctness of the vote. This area of research is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
As stated, most of the research on voting behaviour has been done in the American on British 
context. However, there is some research done in the European context and in a multiparty 
system (e.g., Rivero, 2015; Boudreau, Elmendorf and MacKenzie, 2015). It has been shown 
that the number of parties does matter in voting choices. For example, Gallego (2010) states 
that there is evidence in research that political party number is correlated with the amount of 
information people possess – for the more informed larger numbers of candidates and political 
parties are a positive attribute, whereas for the not so informed they are a negative attribute. 
Therefore, studying information acquisition in a multiparty system is bound to present 
different, and perhaps more insightful findings than the literature on two-party systems has so 
far. 
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There is also evidence from the Finnish case in voting behaviour. Westinen (2015) in his article 
on cleavages in Finnish political participation found that social cleavages are indeed connected 
to party choices and the value-attitude dimension of choice making. Additionally, Wass and 
von Schoultz (2015) found that voter preferences for party representation in the government 
increases with age and education. Furthermore, Lahtinen, Wass and Hiilamo’s (2016) argue 
that the free and equal education in Finland provides a good starting point for social mobility 
and thus more mobility in voting patterns (Lahtinen et al., 2016). However, there is no notable 
research in the field of voting decision-making.  
 
3.2.Voting correctly 
As mentioned rational choice and correct voting have received a lot of attention in the voting 
literature. But what is rationality and rational choice? Downs (1957, p.146) presents the 
following economic axiom:  
“It is always rational to perform any act if its marginal return is larger than its marginal cost”. 
Bendor (2011) states that rational choice theory has contributed a lot to the understanding of 
political behaviour. Additionally, Larcinese (2007) points out that many times voting 
behaviour is explained through the tools of rational choice theory. However, he argues that 
there is a problem with this view because what is rational to an actor largely depends on that 
actor’s perceptions of what reality is and not so much of what the optimal solution would be. 
(Larcinese, 2007, p.249-250.) 
 
Rationality can indeed be difficult to define and measure in individual decisions. Lau and 
Redlawsk (1997) begin their paper by pointing out that there is only a minority of people who 
can literally be rational voters by keeping themselves informed and therefore making rational 
voting choices. Martinelli (2007) supports this claim that being informed is not universal. 
However, he does point out that generally the utility of the informed voter will be much higher 
than the utility of the uninformed one (Martinelli, 2007). Therefore, Martinelli (2007, p. 315) 
proposes a revised, “weaker” version of the rational ignorance hypothesis by stating that 
because the costs to stay informed are so high, an individual voter would prefer to stay 
uninformed in larger elections where their contribution is not notable.  
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As the nature of rational behaviour is disputable another term is frequent in the literature - 
“correct voting”. It was developed by Lau and Redlawsk, who (1997) define a correct vote as 
one which is made with individual considerations of beliefs and values in mind, and not with 
globally beneficial considerations as a prioroty. The authors also point out that in order for a 
vote to be correct it should be made as if the voter had all the information needed to make a 
fully informed rational choice (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997). Since then the literature on voting 
behaviour has primarily used this term. For example, Joesten and Stone (2014, p.747) use the 
term ““correct” voting” to define the vote which goes to the ideologically most proximate 
candidate. This will also be how the term will be used in this thesis – the correctness of the 
vote will be measured by the ideological distancing between the voter and the candidate on an 
ideological line. 
 
Furthermore, Tyszler and Shram (2016) state that the assumption behind correct voting is 
taking the aggregated results from individual’s best-chosen candidate, who matches 
ideologically the closest to the individual. However, the authors recognize that there is a 
problem with such voting, as often individuals engage in strategic voting which in turn means 
they do not necessarily vote for the most preferred option but for an option that with highest 
probability would result in a best outcome. In a sense the authors make a distinction between 
an optimal outcome and optimal individual preference. (Tyszler and Schram (2016).) This is 
an important point to make, and a further justification for not using strategic considerations in 
this thesis. In a related fashion, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) state that there are many who 
claim that voting altogether is irrational. However, they show that this opinion occurs because 
utility from voting would be looked at only as a contribution to a common good and not 
consider variables unrelated to contribution that might be of intrinsic value to the individual, 
like duty (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).  
 
So, what does drive the individual to vote – personal interest or a greater good? The high stakes 
voting literature (Andersen, Fiva & Natvik, 2014; Gershkov and Szentes, 2009; Bognar, 
Börgers & Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2015) concludes that an individual is more likely to vote or take 
interest in elections if they feel their vote matters or can be of importance for the outcome. 
According to Andersen, Fiva and Natvik (2014) rational choice theory assumes that individuals 
vote because they can have an influence on the results of the election. They also point out that 
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an individual only votes if their benefit exceed their costs (Andersen et al. (2010). Although 
their research concentrates on voting turnout, this can be applied to the more general idea of 
voting behaviour – the individual will try to vote in a way that maximizes their outcome. 
 
3.3.Information acquisition and cognition in voting 
As can be seen from the already mentioned research, the vote and the related utility is often 
associated with information. As Gallego (2010) points out people who are more informed tend 
to turn out and to vote in a way that is profitable for themselves. Supporting this claim, 
Larcinese (2007, p.250) argues that by viewing voting as an instrumental action and 
considering rationality, closeness with regard to vote differences in outcomes should 
incentivise voters to seek out information as their vote is perceived as more valuable.  
 
Even though Tyzsler and Scram (2016) used information to study strategic voting, they too 
bring out the importance of information in decision-making. In addition, Ryan (2010) states 
that it is usually perceived that an informed vote is a more accurate one. All of this evidence 
suggests that information is important for forming the voting choice. But what amount of 
information is enough to vote correctly? 
 
Grosser and Seebauer (2016) look at voting correctly in a group and state that whenever the 
vote is informed and sincere by all voters, then the outcome becomes correct. Furthermore, 
Downs (1957) states that information does not only come from the electoral campaigns of a 
given party, but also from the current performance of the party in the government. This comes 
to show that there is a lot of information available and in theory one could become fully 
informed and make a reasonable, and advantageous to themselves and to society, decision 
about which candidate to select. 
 
However, this abundance of information does have its drawbacks. Lau and Redlawsk (1997) 
show in their study and experiments, that there is so much information on candidates that 
individuals could relate all the pieces of information they have in numerous different ways to 
the candidates and themselves and thus reach a varied number of “best” outcomes. In addition, 
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Lupia (1992) points out that there are information asymmetries between voters, as the 
information quality and degree differ between individuals, which in turn might lead to false 
expression of preferences. The author also states that there is a principal-agent problem in 
voting, as the agenda setters - the parties and candidates - have complete information about 
policies and the current state of the world, whereas the deciding party – the voters – have 
incomplete information (Lupia, 1992). Downs (1957) points out that for these reasons there is 
a need for expertise-agents to fill the gaps of imperfect information. Lupia (2016) calls these 
competent informants educators, as they bring the needed relevant information to the voter. 
Ryan (2010) argues, following Downs’ (1957) concept of political informants, that to make 
information acquisition costs lower individuals tend to select their sources according to certain 
criterion. These include a certain value-bound agreeableness in ideologies, as well as a 
perceived agent-expertise (Ryan, 2010). However, it could be argued that these agents only 
further deepen the principal-agent problem, as there is not only a discrepancy of incentives 
between the voter and the elected official, but now there is an expert, speaking on behalf of one 
of these agents and driven by their own motives. 
 
Downs (1957) states there is another reason for imperfect information to be common among 
voters - knowing everything is highly costly. As comparing information about parties is costly, 
individuals turn to the party’s ideological standpoint which summarizes the views of the party 
(Downs, 1957, p.141). Additionally, Oliveros (2012) stresses in his paper that the amount of 
the information acquired always depends on the utility losses, especially as the ratios are 
considered. This brings us back to the rationality discussion and the proportions between the 
gains and losses in the voting situation. 
 
In addition, Bognar, Börgers & Meyer-ter-Vehn (2015) state in their paper that information 
acquisition cannot be without cost, especially if the information has positive externalities for 
the individual that lie outside of their personal interest. In the same line of thought, Gershkov 
and Szentes (2009) state in their study that as it can be very costly, and at times inefficient, to 
acquire all the information needed. Therefore, optimal mechanisms for information acquisition 
that might not necessarily bear the highest quality of results or knowledge are applied to reduce 
the information gap (Gershkov and Szentes, 2009). Although these two papers study voting in 
a situation where information is shared between participants, these kinds of cost reducing 
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mechanisms can be applied in a more personal context. For example, Lau, Andersen and 
Redlawsk (2008) state that the individual does not have the cognitive capacity to stay fully 
informed and hold their elected officials responsible to fulfilling their promises from election 
campaigns. They conclude that it is for this reason that intuitive voting comes in (Lau, 
Andersen and Redlawsk, 2008).  
 
However, there are other factors beside the amount of information that matter. Ghosal and 
Lockwood (2009) state in their paper that not only the amount of information, but also the type 
of information that an individual has will influence their vote. They also state that when the 
individual considers the information they have when formulating their vote decision, they 
improve the collective outcome of the vote. The authors also found that when the bias in the 
electorate is low, individuals tend to acquire information and base their decisions on that 
information. (Ghosal and Lockwood (2009).) Additionally, Oliveros’ (2012) paper concludes 
that individual voters collect different quality of information in equilibrium, depending on their 
intensity of ideology and the precision selected for the signal received.  
 
To further this claim, Joesten and Stone (2014) investigate spatial voting and argue that an 
individual cannot possess all the required information to be able to surely say which candidate 
is at the ideal ideological distance to them. Ideological distances are discussed in more detail 
in the next section of this chapter. Joesten and Stone (2014) also found that even if the voter 
does not have all the information he/she does seem to vote in a way that resembles proximity 
voting. The authors argue that information might not be as necessary as thought and that similar 
patterns of decision-making may occur due to other factors, such as social networks or beliefs 
(Joesten and Stone, 2014).  
 
Moreover, if we take the individual abilities and interest into account, there are different drivers 
for voting and information acquisition. Verba, Nie and Kim (1987) studied the role of 
institutional affiliation in political activity by comparing data from different countries and 
found that in the case of voting the individual social resources and interest were of most 
importance. Furthermore, Lau et al. (2008) state that drawing on correct voting there are two 
main motivators for decision-making – to make a good and easy decision. They add that the 
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effort exerted would depend on the stakes of the decision and on the individual’s inherent 
cognitive abilities (Lau et al., 2008). 
 
Kahneman (2003) terms the ease of association in cognitive tasks as “accessibility”. This 
accessibility is stated to be a continuum in which by repetition and association tasks become 
less effortless and more relatable. Kahneman (2003) states that the notion of good and bad is 
almost automatic as is carried out by natural assessment. Moreover, ambiguity is stated to be 
suppressed by perception. The accessibility in Kahneman’s (2003) paper shows that rationality 
may not always be the answer, as some more intuitive decisions can be made due to higher 
accessibility. (Kahneman, 2013.) 
 
Downs (1957) repeatedly reminds us that there is no perfect information, as the amount of 
information needed to make a perfectly informed decision is impossible to obtain, and mostly 
– there is no perfect decision. He also states (Downs, 1957, p.147): “it is irrational for most 
citizens to acquire political information for purposes of voting.” In the end, as Degan and Li 
(2015) point out, there is no right answer for how people vote – their behaviour could depend 
on various reasons from personal benefit and expression, to aspiration to act as the rest of the 
population, or even regret. 
 
3.4.Ideological, partisan and personality-related concerns in voting 
To better understand voting behaviour, it is useful to look at what the main personal 
determinants for voting choices are. Krosnick (1988) states that voters often search for parties 
and candidates who have the same ideologies and attitudes in terms of policies. However, 
Converse (1964, in Converse, 2006) points out that ideology is not a simple thing to define. 
 
It is frequently mentioned in the literature that information acquisition and ideology are related. 
Oliveros (2012) states in his paper that ideology and information acquisition are strongly linked 
– new information can act as bias strengthening to the voter who is not ideologically bound, 
whereas the highly ideological voter rarely searches for new information. For example, 
Boudreau, Elmendorf and MacKenzie (2015) found in their study on local US elections that in 
14 
 
elections with less information on the candidates, individuals tend to be more interested in the 
ideological distancing between themselves and a candidate. Additionally, the authors conclude 
that certain information cues about partisanship or other non-policy related information makes 
the ideological distancing less influential in decision-making (Boudreau et al., 2015). 
 
However, in other studies it has been seen that ideology might be of the most importance to the 
voter. Brown’s (1970) investigation into the differences between the ideological standpoints of 
the elitist doctrine and the populist one bore interesting results. By comparing groups with 
strong or little to no interest in politics and their choice of placement of political statements on 
an importance scale over time, he was able to reach conclusions about the centrality of 
participants and the consistency of their beliefs. Brown (1970) found that for both treatment 
groups the ideology seemed to be persistent over time, even though otherwise there seemed to 
be no significant differences between the two groups. (Brown, 1970.) 
 
Furthermore, Larcinese (2009) points out that partisanship and ideology have been shown to 
be one of the strongest determining factors of voting choice formation. He states that the 
willingness to acquire information is related firstly to the existence of prior beliefs and opinions 
about parties and candidates, and secondly to the possibilities that the new information will 
change prior beliefs and evaluations (Larcinese, 2009, p. 4). Larcinese (2009) states that 
according to a study on British voter’s choices, individuals on “the intermediate levels of 
ideological strength” (p.5) are the most likely to have incentives to seek for additional 
information about candidates and parties. Similarly, Jessee (2010, p.328) states that usually 
when there is less information available, individuals do not seem to be influenced by 
ideological distancing, whereas with a higher level of information the policy stances of 
candidates improve in importance. He also sees that partisanship plays a role in the willingness 
to acquire information and depends on that information as determining in the choice-making 
process (Jessee, 2010). From this it can be concluded that ideology seems to be more important 
than partisanship in determining the final voting choice. 
 
Another example of similar findings is the one by Boudreau, Elmendorf and MacKenzie 
(2015). They state that ideological positions are not always related to partisanship. In their 
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study of local elections where voters did not necessarily have information on the political 
affiliation of the candidate, it seemed that the criteria for choosing a candidate was their policy 
and other ideological positions. (Boudreau et al., 2015.) However, Ansolabehere and Puy 
(2017) state that usually in elections there are multiple issues and policies that are of interest 
to the voter, and there is a problem in ranking those in accordance to importance to the voter.  
 
It would seem that there is something missing in the considerations of choice-making. All of 
the information required for a rational choice cannot be obtained, and partisanship or 
ideological standpoints do not always entirely define the voter’s choice. Therefore, the 
individual aspect of the voter’s decision-making process has to be taken into account. In a 
broader sense, it has been shown that the person’s psychology and especially personality have 
an effect on how they vote, especially in terms of ideology and interest in politics (Ha & Lau, 
2015). They point out (p.976) that usually the measured personality characteristics of the voter 
related to political behaviour are: political ideology, interest, efficacy, discussion and 
participation, as well as civic duty. Additionally, it is brought up that personal traits have been 
shown to have influence on party identification. Ha and Lau (2015, p.987) found in their 
research, that personality traits in themselves do not have statistical significance in determining 
whether or not the individual votes correctly. However, in a second model, personality traits 
when controlled for with variables associated with correct voting, do seem to be significant at 
the 95% level. (Ha and Lau, 2015.) 
 
Some other research such as the one by Hillygus (2005) has found that higher education 
increases some of the abovementioned traits as it provides the understanding of how politics 
work, thus lowering the effort of participation, and provides the network in which to discuss 
political questions. Lipset (1957) also stressed the role of education in understanding political 
processes and a fuller participation in a democratic society. 
 
However, it does not only depend only on the personal dimension when we choose whom to 
vote for. Coleman (1988) states that in voting choices we often take into account norms, as 
well as the preferences of our ingroup members. This notion of there being a strong normative 
influence on voting choices will not be investigated in detail in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is 
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important to point out that there might be other strong influential variables than the ideological 
considerations of the individual. 
 
To sum up, decision-making in voting is not a straightforward process. There are individual 
traits that affect behaviour and that give different weights to either policy and ideology related 
considerations, or to other personal conserns. However, there seems to be a consensus that 
information on candidates’ and parties’ ideological standing, the state of the world and the 
active participation in democracy-enhancing activities improves the individual’s and society’s 
gains and payoffs. 
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4. Hypotheses 
Drawing on the abovementioned literature, the following hypothesis relating to the research 
questions have been outlined: 
 
Hypothesis:  
The information acquisition costs will have a negative impact on the utility of the voter. 
However, information acquisition in itself will increase the gains of voting. 
 
The negative impact notion is presented because the information acquisition costs are deducted 
from the overall gain of voting. However, the acquired information itself and the amount of it 
can have a significant impact on the maximizing of the vote utility, as the voter requires 
information on the state of the world and on candidate or party positions.  
 
Sub hypothesis: 
1) The information acquisition costs are highly influential to the utility of voting. 
 
The correct positioning of the candidates in relation to the voter and decision-making in 
accordance to one’s most valuable preference makes information acquisition, and especially 
the deducted costs related to it, crucial to the voting choice. Not only are the costs influenced 
by the amount of information acquired, but also the accuracy of information and the 
truthfulness of other variables depend on the information gathered. 
 
2) The amount of information “enough” to make a voting choice will be the one maximizing 
one’s personal utility. The threshold of information gathered will vary across 
individuals. 
 
As stated in the literature review, the notion of “enough” information can vary significantly 
between individuals due to different priorities in decision-making processes. Some voters will 
have stronger ideological and policy-related preferences, whereas some will feel that 
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partisanship and normative considerations are of most importance when voting. Moreover, 
there are inherent skill-related considerations which affect the amount of information the voter 
is willing to obtain. Therefore, individuals will have different incentives and thresholds related 
to the amount of information acquired.  
 
In more economic terms, the costs should be always less than, and proportionate to, the gain 
from voting in order to maximize the utility from voting. The difference in thresholds for 
information acquisition amounts will be dependent on the individual utility, and individual 
considerations of the voter. 
 
3) Readily available information does have an influence on information acquisition. 
 
It is more realistic to assume that the voter has some sort of readily available signal about either 
the state of the world or the ideological stance of at least one the parties or candidates running 
for election. This initial information will have a defining impact on the willingness to acquire 
information. If this information satisfies the choice criteria for the voter, he/she will most likely 
not be willing to invest in acquiring any additional information. However, if the signal is of 
negative value to the voter, as giving information on a candidate the voter does not intend to 
vote for, he/she will feel the need to find a better suited candidate through investing in more 
information. As in the previous sub-hypothesis, also in the case of initially available 
information the willingness to seek for information will rely on the voter’s priorities in 
decision-making, as well as on personal ability. 
 
To sum up, information acquisition and the related costs are very influential to the outcome of 
the voting choice. Information acquisition itself can be a utility enhancing feature, whereas the 
information acquisition costs can have a negative impact on the voting utility. The strength of 
influence of information acquisition is dependent on the personal ability, interest and priorities 
of choice-making in a voting setting. The next section gives a more insightful answer to these 
influences through mathematical modelling. Empirical evidence on the influence of 
information acquisition costs can be found in the results of the pilot experiment. 
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5. Theoretical model 
For the purposes of quantifying the elements of voting behaviour and being able to answer the 
posed research question of how information acquisition costs influence the voting choice, and 
especially to show the magnitude and importance of acquiring information, as well as to relate 
those costs to the other important and influential variables, it is seen as necessary to construct 
a mathematical model.   
 
Previous research on the matter of voting behaviour (e.g., Larcinese, 2006; Triossi, 2013; 
Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009; Dassonneville, Hooghe and Miller, 2017; Singh and Roy, 2018) 
presents mathematical models – some of which very detailed and complex. Many (e.g., Triossi 
(2013), Tyszler and Schram (2016)) have elements of strategic behaviour, while others (e.g., 
Larcinese (2006), Ghosal and Lockwood (2009)) consider the costs of voting on election day. 
As the purpose of this thesis is to look at the very initial stages of voting choice-making, 
assumptions are firstly made to define the area of consideration. Next the model applied is 
described. The model chosen as best suited for the purposes of this thesis is derived from 
previous literature and has been expanded to better serve the multiparty context. 
 
5.1.Assumptions 
A couple of assumptions must be made at the beginning in order to justify the chosen model in 
relation to the main research question about the influence of information acquisition and the 
related costs on the voting choice. These assumptions are made to better define the scope of 
the decision-making process at hand, as well as to state which considerations will be removed 
to simplify and specify the model. 
 
For instance, some of the features of voting analysis can be eliminated to simplify the model 
built. One of these features is the notion of being pivotal – having a decisive influence on the 
outcome of the election (e.g., Larcinese, 2006; Triossi, 2013; Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009). 
As there are many parties as well as and some independents involved in all elections in a 
multiparty system, it is nearly impossible to know when one’s vote would be of major 
importance. It is true that prior to making the voting choice one could obtain information on 
the general popularity of parties and the probabilities of a candidate being elected. This 
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information is in most cases quite accurate and can prompt the voter to behave strategically. 
However, this thesis does not consider strategical voting, as that is another large question which 
in the multiparty system would require extensive modelling. Therefore, it will be assumed that 
there is no effect on the voter’s utility that would arise from being pivotal. 
 
Another feature of voting choice-making which is frequent in the literature (e.g. Triossi (2013)) 
is coalition formation. When coalition formation is considered as a part of voting decision-
making, strategies are assumed to involve a consideration of which parties would be likely to 
go into coalition together and form a government. The purpose in this thesis is not to look at 
strategies, so this consideration will not be considered here either. Even though it would not be 
impossible to speculate coalition formation between parties, the candidate should have some 
knowledge on the possible vote distribution and the parties which will be willing to go into 
coalition together. As this consideration is complex and rather uncertain, and would require 
specific knowledge on the matter, the assumption in this thesis will be that the voter does not 
take into account coalition possibilities when choosing their preferred candidate. 
 
This study is framed as a voting setting. Due to the previously mentioned assumptions some 
additional clarifications have to be made. The first of these is the assumption that the act of 
physically casting a vote is costless. The literature that discusses turnout (e.g. Larcinese, 2006; 
Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009) states that the action of voting can be costly to the individual and 
can have an impact on the overall cost in the utility of the voter. However, the aim of the thesis 
is to look at the very initial stages of forming the voting presumptions and choices. Therefore, 
it was not seen as necessary to include these voting costs. In addition, it would have been 
difficult to estimate the exact costs for individuals as there is no real voting that would require 
a specific added effort taking place.  
 
As previously mentioned, voting is seen as either a compulsory duty or a voluntary right. The 
purpose of this thesis is to see how individuals vote. Therefore, it was seen as necessary for the 
experiment to simulate a compulsory voting situation. It was not explicitly stated that voting is 
compulsory, but the option of not voting was not explicitly given either. To be able to calculate 
one’s payoffs, it was required of the participant to know the ideological distance between them 
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and their chosen candidate. The literature on compulsory voting seems to differ for the real-
life situations and when it comes to laboratory experiments. Dassonneville, Hooghe and Miller 
(2017) found in their paper that compulsory voting decreases voting based on information and 
ideological distances. Similarly, Singh and Roy (2018) found in their research that compulsory 
voting decreases the individual’s incentives to look for information on candidates. However, 
in laboratory experiments the compulsory vote is frequently used. An example of such a 
situation is Tyszler and Schram’s (2016) experiment on strategic voting. Moreover, Grosser 
and Seebauer (2016) state in their paper that when voting is voluntary, usually uninformed 
voters tend to abstain from voting. Additionally, in their experiment the authors find evidence 
of compulsory voting increasing the amount of information acquired (Grosser and Seebauer, 
2016).  
 
A further assumption in the model is that the candidate’s ideology is one with the party’s which 
he/she represents. In real life a party consists of many candidates who in multiparty and 
especially in open-list proportional voting systems (a voting system in which the voter can 
influence the ranking of candidates inside the party) try to differentiate themselves through 
different policy considerations. However, for the purposes of clarifying calculations in this 
model it is assumed that all candidates have the exact same values as their own party. Therefore, 
considerations about different candidates can be put aside and in this thesis a candidate and a 
party are seen as the same instance. 
 
The issue of partisanship will not be directly discussed in this thesis. However, the effects of 
strong partisan affiliation can be translated into a weight variable which expresses the overall 
interest in the state of the world. As is stated in the literature (e.g. Larcinese, 2009), the strongly 
partisan voters do not usually acquire information on the state of the world as they feel they 
must vote for their own party, regardless of their policy standing and how that standing relates 
to their own. 
 
Finally, it is common to assume that there is a learning curve associated with the increase in 
acquisition of information that would reduce the cost of information after a certain period of 
time. In the cost function in the model the skills of the voter and the amount of information are 
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presumed to be linear as the skill does not increase in the process but is rather a readily available 
measure at the starting point to predict the optimal amount. If a learning curve were to be added, 
it would have to be adjusted accordingly to the personal learning abilities. As these abilities are 
not easily quantifiable, there is a large margin for error. Therefore, the assumption here is that 
the inherent and acquired skills up to the point of facing the voting decision are what determines 
the optimality of the amount of information and the gains from utility maximization. 
 
5.2.The model 
The model for this thesis was mainly derived from Triossi’s (2013) equations on the costs of 
voting choices. The overall utility equation is the same as in Triossi (2013), and the general 
flow of equations follows his logic. However, the rest is modified to better match a multiparty 
setting. Moreover, some considerations in the original article have been omitted as they were 
found to be irrelevant for this thesis. The weight of whether or not a voter is interested in the 
state of the world was chosen from Ghosal and Lockwood’s paper (2009) as it enables the 
differentiation between the interested and not so interested in ideological and policy 
considerations voter and the differences in incentives thereof they might have to acquire 
information. 
 
Attention in this thesis is focused on the utility function of the individual voter. More precisely 
– this utility concerns a very initial decision-making stage which is related to the overall interest 
in politics and voting as well as the ideological distances between the voter and the candidate. 
The full voting utility (denoted as E(U)) is expressed as the utility resulting from selecting the 
better candidate (denoted U (𝑣𝐴)), or the gains of voting correctly, minus the cost (C) of making 
that voting choice and can be expressed as follows: 
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑈(𝑣𝐴) − 𝐶(𝛼, 𝑧) 
For clarity the preferred candidate of the voter will be A and the preferred policy, or state of 
the world, correspondingly – a. The cost in this equation is seen as a function of the inherent 
abilities of the voter 𝛼 and the amount of information retrieved 𝑧. The cost function is expanded 
later on in this chapter. 
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The general assumption with this choice is that: 
𝑈(𝑣𝐴) > 𝑈(𝑣𝐼), 
or that the utility from choosing the preferred candidate A is bigger than the utility from 
choosing any other candidate. To further clarify, the utility from making the individually 
rational choice 𝑈(𝑣𝐴) can be expressed as follows: 
𝑈(𝑣𝐴) = 𝜆𝑞𝑎𝑝𝑎√(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑎)2 + (𝑦 −  𝑦𝑎)2 
In this equation λ stands for Ghosal and Lockwood’s (2009) weight variable, which expresses 
the voter’s interest in the state of the world. The state of the world here is differentiated from a 
private preference where the variable can take the value of 0, if only personal considerations 
matter, or 1, if the state of the world is of importance to the voter. This weight assignment is 
opposite to the one in the article by Ghosal and Lockwood (2009). Their purpose and the 
purpose in this thesis differ and that is why it was necessary to change these values. In this 
thesis the aim is to look at an ideologically informed “correct” choice. The variables in the 
abovementioned model are all connected to information and the state of the world. Therefore, 
an interest in the state of the world would enhance these variables, whereas a disinterest in the 
state of the world would drive this utility close to 0 and show that there are other factors 
governing the individual’s decision, which are not captured by this model.  
 
Additionally, this measure of interest in the state of the world represents valence in the voting 
choice. Jessee (2010, p. 328) states that valence accounts for attributes that are seen as equally 
valuable as policy or ideology by the electorate, such as charisma and intelligence. Gallego, 
Schofield, McAlister & Jeon (2014) describe valence as other, non-policy related 
characteristics of the candidate which appeal to the voter.  
 
The variable 𝑞𝑎 in the voting utility equation expresses the probability that the state of the 
world is indeed a (which would correspond to the chosen candidate A). And the variable 𝑝𝑎 
stands for the probability that the information received on the state of the world a is accurate. 
This variable is tightly linked to information. When there is interest in the state of the world – 
be it policies or values - there is a need to acquire information on it. However, that information 
might be accurate, or such as in the case of fake news, might be misleading. In a multiparty 
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system these probabilities and their truthfulness require a lot of investigation. As Downs (1957) 
states the effort to keep oneself informed about the dealings of individual parties in a multiple 
party case can be tasking.  
 
Overall these two variables are tightly linked but are not equal, as there might be limited access 
to information or the outlets one searches in might be biased in one direction or the other. It 
could be stated that in a democracy without censorship these two come close to being equal 
but in a censored environment there might not even be the opportunity to access correct 
information on the state of the world. 
 
As already mentioned, the variable 𝑝𝑎 expresses the probability that the information received 
about the state of the world is correct. To calculate this likelihood the following equation must 
be solved: 
𝑝𝑎 =
1
𝑁
+ 𝑧 
Or, the probability of the information on the state of the world being correct equals the sum of 
the amount of information received (z) and the probability of the signal of the state of the world 
being a. In the fraction 
1
𝑁
, N is the number of signals about the state of the world.  
 
The √(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑎)2 + (𝑦 −  𝑦𝑎)2 part of the equation expresses the ideological distance between 
the point of a candidate and the voter’s point in the Nolan chart space as measured by Eucledian 
distancing. The Nolan Chart was published by David Nolan in the 70s and depicts two axes 
which represent personal and economic freedom values (Silver, 2010). Given this chart and the 
formula for Eucledian distances, it is clear that the x variable measures the distance on the x-
axis, whereas the y variable measures the distance on the y-axis. This kind of ideological 
distancing and calculations have been used in the literature (e.g., Jessee, 2010; Joesten and 
Stone, 2014). 
 
As already mentioned, the cost of the voter, 𝐶(𝛼, 𝑧), is expressed as a linear function of the 
voter’s inherent skill and the amount of information acquired. As Triossi (2013) states, if the 
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skill of the voter – which includes their education, cognitive abilities - is higher they will 
acquire more information.  
 
From this cost function (𝐶(𝛼, 𝑧)) and the expected utility formula it can be derived that the 
optimal point of amount of information (z), which is also the marginal cost for acquiring 
information, is as follows: 
𝐶𝑧(𝛼, 𝑧) = ∑ 𝜆𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖√(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑦 −  𝑦𝑖)2
𝑧
𝑖=𝑎
 
Or the cost for the optimal amount of information is equal to the sum of utilities for voting for 
each candidate. The sum here of all the expected gains for a certain state is also the marginal 
gain of acquiring information. (Triossi, 2013.) 
 
This is the detailed form of the equation for looking at how information influences the outcome 
of the voting choices. From the breakdown of the equation it can be seen that information does 
indeed have a negative impact on the vote choice as stated in the main hypothesis of this thesis. 
Firstly, the costs for voting come solely from acquiring information, which means that the only 
deducted part in the utility function arises from information acquisition. Secondly, the 
information is essential in the candidate/party choice, as many of the variables are based on 
information, such as the current and possible states of the world, as well as the ideological 
distancing between the voter and the candidate. Therefore, sub hypothesis 1 is seen as true – 
the costs can have a big influence on the utility of voting if they are high enough to change 
significantly the gains from voting for the chosen candidate. 
 
Furthermore, the weight variable 𝜆, which captures individual interest is notable when 
considering sub hypothesis 2, as it shows there can be different incentives for information. The 
optimal cost function best shows that the threshold for acquiring information is dependent on 
all variables that contribute to the utility of the voter and therefore it can be concluded that 
there are thresholds to information, but they vary with individual considerations. The main 
considerations in the voting situation are interest in policy versus interest in other non-policy 
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and ideology related matters, validity and amount of acquired information, as well as the 
voter’s inherent ability. 
 
In the next chapter this model is simplified and adapted to match the purposes of a lab 
experiment. 
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6. Experiment design 
The experiment was devised using previous literature on voting behaviour and ideological 
distancing (Lupia, 1992; Rivero, 2015; Boudreau, Elmendorf and MacKenzie, 2015, Jessee, 
2010; Ansolabehere and Puy, 2017). Generally, laboratory experiments are currently a desired 
method of testing out theoretical models. As Levitt and List (2007) state, laboratory settings 
provide a unique opportunity to test behavioural effects, as in the lab all other things are held 
equal, there is no interference from other factors which could occur in a daily setting. For 
example, Tyszler and Scram (2016) used a laboratory setting to study strategic voting 
behaviour. Additionally, Grosser and Seebauer (2016) ran a laboratory experiment using game 
theoretical concepts to investigate information acquisition and incentives to vote. In their 
experiment information acquisition is seen as the first stage and voting itself as the second stage 
of decision-making (Grosser and Seebauer, 2016). 
 
There are prominent examples of the use of ideological distancing in voting choices. Downs 
argues (1957) that in a multiparty system the parties are even more incentivised to have a 
specific ideological standpoint and remain in that position in order to attract more voters. In his 
example all parties are distributed alongside a one-dimensional axis and occupy a defined point 
on it. As the voters are distributed alongside the ideological line, if a party were to move to one 
direction or the other, it would lose a portion of votes from the other side of the axis. (Downs, 
1957, p.143-144.) Additionally, Jessee (2010, p.327) states that the assumption of a spatial 
model in voting research is that a candidate and a voter have an ideological point in space and 
the voter chooses a candidate based on the distance between these two points. Moreover, Lupia 
(2016) states in Chapter 5 of his book that experimental work is a very good tool for measuring 
the importance of information in voting decisions. 
 
The starting point for the experiment came from the previously discussed mathematical model 
and was adjusted and simplified in order to be able to test the very basic reasons behind 
information acquisition. Also, with considerations to ease the task of the participant, the 
ideological distribution is presented on a single axis as in Downs’ (1957) example and not on 
a Nolan chart as it usually is in real life in multiparty systems. 
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6.1. Ethical considerations 
With the experiment design it was made sure no ethical considerations were overlooked. The 
participants in the experiment attended the same course in Comparative Education Policy. They 
were told a couple of weeks in advance by their teacher that there was going to be an experiment 
held as a part of a class session. Permission to conduct an in-class experiment was granted by 
Tuomo Kuivalainen, the teacher responsible for the course. Participation was voluntary, and 
the subjects were unknown to the experimenter and the assistant. When informed about the 
experiment they were also told they would receive an actual payoff from it. However, as the 
experiment was not funded, only one round’s payoffs were distributed in cash and chocolates. 
 
In the beginning of the instructions the purposes of the experiment were stated (please refer to 
Appendix 1). Throughout the experiment the participants’ anonymity was ensured by assigned 
ID numbers. The round for which the payoffs were given out, as well as the ID of the person 
to receive their payoffs in cash was selected by an online Random Number Generator, the 
operations in which were displayed on a screen, so everyone could follow the procedure. 
 
6.2. Experiment assumptions 
The experiment for this thesis aims to examine the abovementioned model with regard 
especially to the ideological distance choices. In order to simplify the experiment and make it 
more accessible to the participant in a pen and paper version, a couple of modifications to the 
formula had to be made. 
 
Firstly, the candidate or party positions are not displayed along a two-dimensional axis but are 
presented on one axis. This was done so that the participants would not have to perform 
complex calculations and the experiment itself would be more easily approachable to the 
participant. Ideally the two-axis display would present more of a challenge which would even 
further bring out the importance of the inherent skill of the voter, but for a small-scale 
experiment this is not seen as necessary. 
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Secondly, participants will not be self-reporting on their interests towards the state of the world. 
Self-report may not always be accurate. In addition, as there are no concrete issues or states of 
the world presented it would not be relatable enough to give a concrete answer to. Instead, the 
interest in the state of the world could be deduced from the willingness to acquire information 
– if a participant does not look for additional information concerning the position of other 
candidates it could be deduced that they were not too concerned about the state of the world. 
For it to be possible to reach such conclusions, the distances are set as equal or approximately 
equal in the experiment. More detailed description of this positioning can be found below. 
 
Thirdly, the probability of the information about the state of the world being correct is assumed. 
As all the information given will be the only information it will by default be true, there will 
be no fake or misleading news involved. However, the amount of information retrieved is the 
one that will more clearly speak to the probability of the voter knowing the true state of the 
world. If the voter acquires all the information, he/she will know that their knowledge about 
the position of their preferred candidate is the closest to them with a probability of 100%. 
 
Fourthly, the cost of acquiring information is set to be relatively high. In reality costs for 
acquiring information may differ. As in the experiment the task of acquiring information is 
simple and straightforward, it is seen as necessary to make the cost higher. The cost in the 
experiment for a piece of information is 1€, which is approximately 11% of the maximum 9€ 
payoff. This amount is also chosen because it is easily computable in the payoff formula. 
 
Finally, the distribution of the parties along the ideological axis is not revealed. Although in 
real life one would be easily able to acquire information on all the parties position and relate 
them to each other, it is seen that by knowing the distribution one might engage in strategic 
considerations. As previously stated, strategy is not a part of this thesis. Moreover, there are 
interesting behavioural effects arising from uncertainty. These are discussed in more detail in 
section 7.4. of the next chapter.  
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6.3. Pre-pilot experiment  
The pre-pilot experiment was conducted so that the experiment design could be tested and 
improved for the pilot experiment. The participants in this round of experiments were former 
and current students in the Public Choice Programme at the University of Tampere. There were 
altogether 7 participants in this test experiment. The pre-pilot consisted of 3 rounds of voting, 
filling out a survey and distribution of payoffs from a randomly chosen round.  
 
The voting round started off with distribution of ideological axis information about the voter 
and one candidate. The three rounds were differentiated by giving varied positions for the 
participant and candidate positions. The participant’s position was on the far left on the first 
round, on the far right on the second round, and centred in the third round. The candidate 
position distances were also different, being 8, 4 and 7 for the respective rounds. The letter of 
the candidate initially displayed was kept the same – in each round the participant would know 
where candidate “C” stands. This was done so that the participant would suspect that the 
positions in each round are different. 
 
The additional information was also varied in each round. It was presented on separate slips of 
paper the voter could freely choose from. The papers were placed upside down in a randomized 
order, so the participant could select whichever slip of information. The amount of selected 
information could be controlled for in the payoff calculation, which also included their distance 
to the selected candidate. After the three rounds were conducted and the surveys were filled, 
the third round was randomly selected as the paid round and the payoffs were given out in 
chocolate candies to each participant.  
 
The participants were asked to give feedback on the experiment in writing and make 
suggestions on improving the experiment in a discussion-session. It was concluded that 
additional rounds should be added to better capture the decision to seek information. In 
addition, some of the questions in the survey were specified and a question about the strategy 
and choice motivations was added. 
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From the results of the experiment and the feedback it was concluded that there needs to be a 
practise round to make sure everyone understands how to select their candidate and calculate 
their payoffs. Additionally, to make matters simpler for the payoff receiving at the end of the 
experiment, it was seen as beneficial to add a slip of paper which would contain the person’s 
earnings for each round, as the voting sheets were collected after the completion of each round. 
The results of the pre-pilot will not be discussed further, as the purpose of this stage was to 
enhance the experiment design for the pilot experiment. 
 
6.4. Pilot experiment 
The actual pilot experiment which investigated how the information acquisition costs influence 
the utility maximizing vote was conducted in a classroom with students enrolled in the 
Comparative Education Policy course, a part of North American studies. The time of the 
experiment was Monday 05.03.2018 in the afternoon between 14:15 and 15:00. There were 
altogether 9 participants in the experiment.  
 
The experiment began with reading of the instructions by the experimenter, which stated the 
purposes and nature of the experiment. (For the instructions, please refer to Appendix 1.) In 
the instructions the participants were informed they would receive their payoffs for a randomly 
selected round of the game and that one of the participants would receive their earnings in cash, 
whereas the rest would receive their payoff amount in chocolate candy.  
 
The next step was to do a practise round to make sure everyone knew what to do in the actual 
rounds. The participants were given an ideological line displaying their position and the 
position of all 6 candidates (the practise round can be found on the second page of Appendix 
1). The participants were asked to select their chosen candidate and calculate their payoff for 
the round. The researcher and assistant made sure everyone understood the game by going 
through the payoffs with each participant.  
 
The first part of the experiment consisted of four rounds, similar to the ones in the pre-pilot 
experiment. In all rounds the participants were given their own position and the position of one 
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candidate on the ideological axis. The “You”-position was again varied to be left or right. The 
distances to the same candidate “C” were different in all three rounds, the first and third rounds 
having the distance be 6, and the second and fourth rounds having a distance of 4. The number 
of parties was also varied – in the first two rounds the number of parties was 5 and in the second 
two rounds – 7. For all the rounds the positions of the voters were the same.  
 
The second part of the experiment also consisted of 4 rounds. As in the first part, the number 
of parties was varied by every two rounds to be 5 or 7. In this part the positions of the voters 
were varied to create 4 different positioning groups along the ideological axis. The participants 
did not have information on the position of any of the candidates. Thus, they had to rely on the 
additional information. The participants were given the additional information on paper slips, 
placed in sealed envelopes. They were instructed that each opened envelope was a purchase of 
information and had to be marked as purchased with a cost of 1€. For every round the 
participant was presented with a new set of envelopes they could freely choose from. (For 
examples on the three different round types and the additional information slips, please refer 
to appendices 2, 3 and 4.) 
 
The participants were instructed to vote for their preferred candidate by writing the letter of 
their chosen candidate in the designated space. After that they had to calculate their payoffs for 
that round using the formula (10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌), X being the distance between the ”You” 
point and the chosen candidate, and Y being the amount of information acquired. The 
participants were also asked to transfer their payoff result on an additional payoff slip (see 
Appendix 6). After completing all the rounds, the participants were asked to fill in a survey 
(see Appendix 5) through which all the background information of the participants was 
received. At the very end of the experiment a round and a participant were selected using an 
online random number generator.  
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7. Prediction 
To state the expected results in accordance to the theory of utility maximization and rational 
behaviour, a prediction is formulated before conducting the experiment. These predictions 
assume that the individual wants to maximise their profit. It is noted that in a real-life situation 
there might be other factors governing the individual’s decision making than profit and 
probabilities. However, these are not of interest to the purposes of the thesis and therefore are 
not included in the predictions or results. 
 
In the probabilistic sections, the predictions were based on calculating the payoff by varying 
the amount of information and the distances to the candidate chosen. This method was also 
used when the distances between a candidate and the “you” point were chosen for the 
experiment, and when the amount of costs to be paid per information piece purchase was 
decided. In the first section, an overall expression of information purchase choices is displayed. 
In the second and third sections the predictions for the pilot experiment parts are discussed 
separately. Finally, ambiguity and risk aversion are discussed as predictors of individual 
behaviour. 
 
7.1.Theoretical prediction 
There can be a general prediction made about the decision to acquire information at each step. 
In order to show these predictions, each payoff is denoted as 𝑓. The payoff equation 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌) is used, where 𝑋 is the ideological distance between the “you” point and 
the candidate chosen and 𝑌 is the amount of information retrieved. To vote, the participant 
must know the initial distance of at least one candidate. That information might be readily 
given. In this case let the initial known distance be 𝑚 and the payoff the following: 
𝑓1 = (10 − 𝑚) − (1 𝑥 0) = 10 − 𝑚 
At this point the voter can choose whether they want to acquire more information or vote for 
this candidate. For it to be profitable for the individual to look for more information the payoff 
for the second decision, after paying the cost for the information purchased, should be greater 
than the first one, or 𝑓2 >  𝑓1. Or in more detailed terms: 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 1) > (10 − 𝑚) − (1 𝑥 0) 
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𝑋 < 𝑚 − 1 
This equation shows that for the second profit to be bigger, the ideological distance in the first 
draw of information must be less than 𝑚 − 1. And from the true value of 𝑚, the probabilities 
of that kind of an ideological distance being drawn can be calculated. 
 
In the case in which there is no readily available information one purchase of information has 
to be made in order for the participant to be able to perform a payoff calculation. The payoff in 
this case is the following: 
𝑓1 = (10 − 𝑚) − (1 𝑥 1) = 9 − 𝑚 
The payoff without initial information is smaller in the minimal information acquisition 
situation, as one must pay for at least one information piece. To determine whether to purchase 
more information, one should compute whether 𝑓2 >  𝑓1, or: 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 2) > (10 − 𝑚) − (1 𝑥 1) 
𝑋 < 𝑚 − 1 
With a value known for 𝑚, the probability of drawing 𝑋 can be calculated. This method of 
decision can be applied to each following step in order to calculate whether it is profitable to 
continue purchasing information. 
 
To sum up, when deciding whether to purchase more information the following criterion has 
to be taken into consideration:  
𝑓𝑛 >  𝑓𝑛−1 
where 𝑛 is the number of the next information piece and 𝑛 − 1 is the current, or any of the 
previous information pieces, which generates the highest payoff. And more precisely: 
𝑋 < 𝑚 − 1 
where 𝑋 is any possible ideological distance to be drawn and 𝑚 is the (smallest) known 
ideological distance to a candidate. 
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To make a “correct” decision on acquiring additional information, one needs to know the 
probabilities with which they could receive a better payoff. As there is no information on the 
distribution of parties, the participant can make estimations on overall probabilities.  
 
7.2.Probabilistic prediction with initial distancing 
In the first part of the pilot experiment the participant is given readily available information on 
one candidate. The payoff function, as mentioned in the previous section, is (10 − 𝑋) −
(1 𝑥 𝑌). The decision to look for additional information would mean that the participant will 
have to pay 1€ for an additional piece of information and still make a higher profit than in their 
current position. In this case, when looking at probabilities with the more extreme ideological 
distance points the scenario is relatively clear. If an initial distance of 1, 2 or 3 is presented it 
is highly inadvisable to look for more information. If the initial distance of 10, 9, or 8 is 
presented it would be rational to look for additional information on candidate positions.  
 
When considering the cost of 1€ per information piece in the case of an initial distance of 5, 
the probability of getting a profit is 33,33% (with a new acquired ideological distance of 1, 2 
or 3 from the “you” position to the candidate), the probability of getting an even payoff is 
11,11% (with a new distance of 4) and of getting a lower payoff is 55,55%. This would suggest 
that when paying for the information, at this point it would not be profitable to look for 
additional information. However, the 5-point distance was not added as an initial distance 
marker, because the association with the value of the number 5 would have been relatively 
neutral to the participant. 
 
When including the cost of 1€/information piece for an initial distance of 4, the probability of 
gaining a profit is 22,22% (if the new distance is 1 or 2), of breaking even – 11,11% (if the new 
distance is 3) and of being at a loss – 66,66%. Therefore, it can be argued that additional 
purchase of information at a known distance of 4 would be risky. However, 4 is close to the 
middle ideological distance value, so there still is a probability to get a lower distance value. 
Additionally, the association with the number 4 can be good enough to deter individuals from 
looking for additional information. For these reasons the 4-point ideological distance was 
chosen as an initial distance. 
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With a given distance of 6, the probability of getting information on a party that is ideologically 
closer, with the included cost of 1€ per information piece, is 44,44% (with a new distance of 
1, 2, 3 or 4), there is a 11,11% probability of getting the same profit outcome (with a new 
distance of 5), and a 44,44% probability that the information given is for a party that is further 
away on the ideological distance axis (with a new distance of 7, 8, 9 or 10). This is an interesting 
point to look at, as the gain and loss percentages are equal when considering the costs of 
information purchase. As there is an equal probability to get a higher or a lower payoff, it would 
not be advisable to look for more information. However, the number 6 might give an 
impression of being of a high distance value and therefore can give an association of loss in 
profit and consequently prompt the individual to search for more information. Kahneman 
(2003) titles this kind of a distortion of probabilistic facts “heuristic-induced bias” – a bias in 
judgement which occurs due to certain intrinsic cues.  
 
With a distance of 7, the probability of getting a party closer to the “you” position and thus 
generating a bigger profit after paying 1€ for one information piece is 55, 55%, for getting an 
equal payoff – 11,11%, and for getting information on a party that is further away from the 
“you” point – 33,33%. In this case it is advisable to look for information, as it is more probable 
to get a result generating higher payoff. As the number 7 is already further from the smaller 
numbers, it will have negative payoff associations. That is why it was not chosen as an initial 
distance. 
 
7.3.Probabilistic prediction with no initial information 
In the second part of the experiment the participants have no initial information on the party 
positions. Therefore, they have to purchase at least one information piece to have an ideological 
distance with which to calculate their payoffs. In their first draw of information the participant 
gets a random initial distance marker. If the first draw of the voter is between 1 and 6, with 
their initial payment of 1€ for the first information on some candidate, it would not be profitable 
for the participant to look for additional information.  
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With a draw of 1 or 2 as the initial distance there is no possibility for a better outcome (as in 
the case of 2, having a daw of 1 can only even the outcome after payment for the additional 
information). In the case of 3 and 4 there is only 1/9 or 2/9 chance to have a better payoff 
outcome from the next draw of additional information. In the case of 5 as an initial distance 
there is a 33,33% probability to get a better outcome than the one at hand, 11,11% to get the 
same outcome, and a 55,55% probability to get a worse outcome. And in the case of a drawn 
distance of 6 the probabilities are 44,44% to get a better payoff, 11,11% to get an equal payoff 
and 44,44% to get a lower payoff. Therefore, it would not be advisable to purchase additional 
information when considering the probability of the outcomes with all of these first-drawn 
information pieces. 
 
However, with the bigger ideological distances of 7-10 it would be more profitable to continue 
drawing information, as the probabilities for a higher payoff are favourable. With a distance of 
7 the probability for getting a better payoff by drawing additional information is 55,55%, the 
probability for getting an equal payoff is 11,11%, and the probability for getting a lower payoff 
is 33,33%. In the case of drawing a first distance of 8 the probabilities are 66,66% to get a 
better payoff, 11,11% to get an equal payoff, and 22,22% to get a lower payoff. If the first 
drawn distance is 9, the probabilities are 77,77% to get a better payoff, 11,11% to get an equal 
payoff, and 11,11% to get a worse payoff. If the first drawn distance is 10, there is no worse 
outcome possible, 1/9 probability to get an equal outcome in payoffs and 8/9 probability to get 
a better outcome.  
 
These probabilities have concerned only the first draw of information in a situation where there 
is no information or the profitability of getting any information in a case of initial distances. 
As the participants will not have knowledge on the distribution of the parties along the 10-point 
scale of ideological distances, these probabilities are not easy to compute further on. There is 
an ambiguity problem, which translates into an ambiguity aversion question in the decision-
making process. 
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7.4.Ambiguity and risk related attitudes 
As the individual is not given information on the distribution of the parties within the 10-point 
possible distances, they cannot make accurate predictions on probabilities. Not providing the 
distribution gives way to ambiguity-related individual attributes. These are separate from the 
risk-related inclinations. Ambiguity aversion, neutrality or love is related to imperfect 
information on the possible outcomes of a decision. Fox and Tversky (1995) state that this 
situation is close to reality, especially in such situation as medical treatments or in business 
life. As already stated the voting situation is similar – one cannot always have all the 
information unless they invest the time and devote themselves to it.  
 
Moreover, Fox and Tversky (1995) show in their comparison of multiple studies in which 
ignorance and ambiguity were juxtaposed, that comparison of events or people seem to drive 
ambiguity aversion. They also argue that this comparison in “realistic”, as when something is 
unknown individuals tend to solve it by relating in to something similar (Fox and Tversky, 
1995). In this case, the participants will have the numbered distances to associate to previous 
rounds, but more prominently they will associate the distances to the number’s value within a 
1 to 10 point scale. 
 
Attanasi, Gollier, Montesano and Pace (2014) investigate ambiguity aversion in their 
experimental paper with a ten-round game. In their experiment, similarly to this thesis’ 
experiment, one of the treatments is with an unknown distribution. They show in their 
prediction that in case of uncertainty of distribution a positive signal will always be favoured, 
but in the case of a negative signal or total ambiguity, total ambiguity will be preferred 
(Attanasi et al., 2014). 
 
In another paper, Attanasi, Corazzini, Georgantzis and Passarelli (2014) look at risk aversion. 
The interesting thing here is a similar division of no information on distribution in one 
treatment, and favourable or unfavourable probabilities in a voting context. Again, it is shown 
experimentally that signals have an impact on confidence, with a tendency to shift beliefs 
towards the median. However, it is shown that this confidence is not related to risk-aversion. 
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(Attanasi et al., 2014.) In this case the disruption in perception leads us back to ambiguity-
related attitudes. 
 
Taking into account this ambiguity-related literature, a prediction can be made about the 
experiment, that when the voter is given an initial distance of 4, they will overestimate their 
winning chances and not look for information. In the case of a negative signal of a distance of 
6 – they will underestimate their possibility to win, so they will look for additional information. 
Additionally, the participants are presented with differing candidate numbers, 5 in half of the 
rounds and 7 in the other half of the rounds, which in terms of outcomes and probabilities 
should not make a difference. However, due to initial association, individuals might see the 
size difference as an important factor and behave differently in the treatment. The third 
treatment of electorate composition could have an impact in a strategic setting. Additionally, 
as the participants will not be informed about whether their position and the other participants’ 
positions are the same or different, this treatment will most likely not have an impact on voter 
decisions. 
 
Another individual feature that can make the individual behave differently in relation to the 
other participants is risk-related attitude. As Eckel and Grossman (2002) state in their paper 
risk can have different applications depending on the context. In the context of this thesis and 
the experiment risk will refer to the choice of whether to purchase information when at least 
one distance is known. There are three types of risk attitudes– risk aversion, neutrality or 
seeking behaviour. In this context it could be said that a risk averse individual would not look 
for information if he/she already has information on a candidate whose ideological distance to 
him/her is 6 or less. A risk neutral individual would be an individual who would not invest in 
information when their known distance to a candidate would be 5 or less or 6 or less (depending 
on what associations they make). And a risk seeking individual would look for information 
whenever there is a possibility to gain a better payoff by purchasing more information. 
 
However, it should be noted that there might be circumstances affecting the risk attitude of the 
individual. For example, Eckel and Grossman (2002) found that even though it is stated that 
men and women differ in their risk attitudes, there should not be presumptions made on 
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behaviour only based on gender differences. As there is no assessment of risk attitudes, there 
will be no speculation on behaviour in the experiment regarding risk attitudes. However, it is 
important to point out that individual risk attitudes, as well as the individual ambiguity attitudes 
will play a role in shaping the end decision of the individual voter. 
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8. Experiment findings 
The aim of this chapter is to present the findings of the conducted experiment. As the next 
chapter focuses on a discussion of the findings, a more descriptive approach is taken here to 
specify the subject pool and the results. Firstly, the sample is described. Secondly, the overall 
results and data are described and finally, an overview of the individual-bound data is given. 
 
The experiment conducted follows the within-subjects design. Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn 
(2012, p. 1) describe the within-subject design as one in which an individual is exposed to 
multiple treatments and through which behaviour change with contextual change can be 
observed. The authors point out that this type of design helps with increasing the data points in 
low participation experiments, but caution against a contextual bias in which decisions are 
affected by already presented information (Charness et al., 2012). In this experiment it is 
acknowledged that there is a possible learning curve. However, it is not seen as bringing too 
much bias to the individual, as the learning curve is anticipated. Moreover, it is realistic to 
assume that in a voting situation there is a certain repetition of events, as voting is not an 
independently occurring event.  
 
In addition, due to the small sample size of the experiment there will be no econometric analysis 
run, as the results would be biased and unrepresentative of the true nature of decision-making 
with ideological distancing. Most of the results are presented through descriptive statistics. All 
the analysis and the graphs were produced using R and Excel. The raw experiment results from 
the rounds and the survey can be found in Appendix 7. The data was reconfigured in a couple 
of sets to make the analysis easier. This chapter first investigates the sample of the experiment 
by describing the survey responses. The second section gives an overall description of the 
results. The third section looks at the different treatment results. The chapter concludes with 
an overview of the within-subject results. 
 
8.1. Sample description 
The full duration of the pilot experiment was 45 minutes. The participants were given 3 minutes 
to complete each round, but only in the first round the full time was needed to complete the 
rounds. In the rest of the rounds participants took from 1min 40sec to 2min to complete a round. 
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After the experiment, the round chosen for the payoffs by the random number generator was 
round 3 and the individual chosen by the same method to receive their payoffs in cash had an 
ID number 6. The participant was paid their 3 € earnings in cash and the rest received chocolate 
candies according to their payoffs. 
 
In the initial analysis stage of the pilot experiment it was noted that one of the participants was 
an outlier – their payoffs were clearly different from those of the other participants. They 
received a lower range payoff in almost every round, with payoffs having even negative values. 
Through their survey responses – they did not vote and were not too interested in political 
voting - and the sporadic nature of their payoffs it was concluded that the participant did not 
understand the game (as self-reported only until round 2). It was thus decided that this subject 
was to be removed from the analysis.  
 
The end sample consisted of 8 students. Only one of these participants was male, so there was 
no possibility to look for gender effects on voting choices. Half of the participants (4/8) were 
exchange students, 3 of the other half of the participants were studying on a Bachelor-level and 
1 was studying on a Master-level. All of the participants currently studied in the University of 
Tampere. The group was international – 3 participants were from Finland, 2 from South Korea, 
1 participant was from Japan, 1 from China and 1 from Spain. This is important as it speaks to 
the system the voters are used to.  
 
In China there is a one-party system, whereas Finland, Spain, South Korea and Japan have a 
multiparty system. However, in the Spanish case until 2015 there was practically a two-party 
system in place (Orriols and Cordero, 2016). In Japan there are multiple parties in elections, 
but one party usually dominates the government (“Japan - Politics, government, and taxation”, 
2018). Finland (“Finland – Government”, 2018) and South Korea (“Korea, South – Politics, 
government and taxation”, 2018) seem to be the countries with a more “real” multiparty 
system, in which multiple different parties can be included in the government to drive their 
policy solutions. It can be expected that especially the countries with an active multiparty 
system have prepared the participants to think about elections in a certain way. Although this 
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is not necessarily the case, because voting is the context of the experiment the political system 
in state might make it easier for the participants to understand the concept of the experiment. 
 
And in fact, there seem to be some cultural effects in the experiment. Although there are no 
conclusive results, it seemed that Finnish participants understood the experiment more easily. 
Additionally, only European participants reported to voting and looking for information always 
when possible, whereas Asian participants reported to voting only when feeling it is necessary 
or not necessarily looking for information on candidates when voting. Moreover, the 
participants who always voted in a multiparty system were the ones with the highest payoffs in 
the practise round. 
 
From the survey responses it was found that 5/8 participants voted every time they could, 2/8 
voted in elections only when they found elections to be of personal interest to them and 1 
participant stated that they voted due to a sense of duty or because urged by their families to 
do so, and not as a form of affecting the state of the world. All participants reported they 
searched for information about the candidates or parties when voting. Most, 5/8, reported they 
always searched for information when voting, whereas the rest, 3/8, reported to looking for 
additional information only sometimes when voting. 
 
Almost all (7/8) participants reported on getting their information about political parties and 
candidates on the media – both traditional and social sources. 75% of participants reported to 
searching for information on their own when looking for a suitable party or candidate to vote 
for. Half of the participants said they had conversations with their friends and family to get 
information on possible candidates to vote for. None reported to utilizing other than the 
mentioned sources, or to speaking with political experts or the candidates themselves. 
 
In the survey, the participants were asked about the way they played and what motivated them 
to make the choices they did. 3/8 of the participants stated they were mindful of their payoffs 
and most of them wanted to keep the payoff above 5. Half of the participants were mindful 
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about the amount of information they purchased and wanted to minimize the information 
acquired. One mention of a cap of 3 information pieces was noted.  
 
3/8 of the participants reported they had distance considerations – 1 of them aimed for less than 
5, whereas the other 2 considered a distance of 3 or less as ideal. One of the participants 
mentioned they wanted to minimize risk in decisions and one mentioned being mindful of the 
candidate numbers (whether there were 5 or 7 parties). All these reports are very interesting, 
as they align with the theory but not necessarily with the actions of the individuals. These 
considerations will be discussed further in the within-subject section and in the next chapter. 
 
8.2.Overall findings 
From the practise round results it was confirmed that a test round through which the principle 
of the game is to be learned is necessary, as only half of the participants managed to generate 
the highest profit when all information was presented to them. (For a reference on the practise 
round, please see Appendix 1.)  
 
The three variables that can be investigated as a result from the experiment are the information 
amount required, the distance to the chosen candidate and the resulting payoffs acquired. The 
summary of these variables for all the rounds conducted can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 2. Overview of the experiment results 
Variable N min max Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Payoff 64 2 8 5,70 6 1,60 
Information 
amount 
64 0 4 1,77 1,5 1,16 
Distance to 
chosen 
candidate 
64 1 6 2,59 2 1,31 
 
From Table 1 it can be seen that overall the payoffs were high. The highest possible amount to 
be earned as a payoff was 8 and it was achieved 12,5% of the times. Additionally, the mean 
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and median are closer to the maximum value, than the minimum. This overall result is in line 
with the reported motivation of the participants to maximize their profits. Moreover, it is in 
line with the prediction and presumption that the individual will try to maximize their profits. 
 
As seen from the above table, the amount of information acquired was low overall. It can be 
noted that there was a tendency to acquire towards the minimal amount of information possible, 
which was reported to be a motivation by some of the participants. In some of the rounds 4 was 
the maximum amount of information the voter could acquire (in the cases were there were 5 
candidates and readily available information on one of the candidates), so also the maximum 
amount of information was acquired.  
 
The distance chosen to the selected candidate also tended to be minimal, although also a 
distance of 6 was chosen once. Although it was stated in the prediction that the distance of 6 is 
a rational one, it can be seen that many of the participants did not view 6 as a favourable 
distance, but rather wanted to minimize the distance to the candidate. Based on these results 
and the reports it is hard to say what motivated the individual the most to make the choices 
they did – was it the distance, payoff or amount of information. As the aim of the thesis is to 
look at the information acquired and the incurring costs with relation to the utility, or in this 
case payoff, these two variables and the distance to the preferred candidate are displayed in the 
following graph.  
 
The averages of each round, in payoff, distance and information acquired are displayed in the 
below Figure 1. The averages were chosen instead of median, because the number of 
observations is few and in order to get a more accurate comparison, a more precise value is 
presented. From the figure it can be seen that the highest paying round is round 5 with an 
average payoff of 7.125. The lowest payoff round in the experiment is round 2 with an average 
of 4.875 in payoffs. In the figure it can be seen that the highest distance to the chosen candidate 
is in round 2 with an average distance of 3.75 to the candidate. Whereas the least distance to 
the chosen candidate with an average 1.625 is chosen in round 5. 
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Figure 1. Average payoff, information and distance per round 
 
It can be seen in Figure 1 that the least information is acquired in round 4 with an average of 
1.125 information pieces purchased. In the second treatment, starting from round 5, where the 
participant had to purchase at least 1 information piece in order to get any information on a 
candidate and calculate their payoffs, the least information was retrieved in round 5 with an 
average of 1.25 information pieces retrieved. Interestingly, that is also the second lowest 
average amount of information acquired in the experiment. The most information was acquired 
in round 6 with an average 2.25 information pieces purchased.  
 
As a general, the directionality of the distances to the candidate chosen and the payoffs are 
opposing – the more distance between the candidate and the voter, the less payoff the voter 
obtained. In contrast, the directionality of the average amount of information acquired and the 
payoffs are the same – with more information there seems to be higher payoffs. In round 5, 
nevertheless, there is a difference in directionality – there is very little information acquired 
and the payoffs are the highest of all rounds. As was stated above, not only was the information 
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amount one of the lowest on average, also the distance to the chosen candidate was one of the 
shortest on average for all the participants. Additionally, when conducting a Welch’s t-test to 
compare averages of information acquisition in all the rounds, the fifth round – the first one in 
which the participants were presented with no information on candidate positions – stood out. 
Therefore, when investigating these results, it seems more likely that the difference in round 5 
occurred by chance, than the round being notably different because of its treatment or other 
characteristics. 
 
A Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare means between rounds (for all of the results of the 
Welch’s t-test, please refer to Appendix 8). When running a t-test in R, a Welch’s result was 
displayed because of unequal variance. The differences in averages per round for the variables 
can be seen from Figure 1 but by conducting the t-tests it could be seen whether there is a 
significant difference between rounds and treatments. It is worth noting that because of the 
small sample size any significance should not be treated as having universal validity. However, 
if there are significant differences they may suggest the need for further investigation.  
 
When comparing the average amount of information acquired between the rounds there was an 
instance where the p-value was smaller than 0.05. In round 6 participants looked on average 
for 2.5 information pieces more. This difference is significant with a p-value = 0.03244. 
However, as established, round 5 was an odd one out in terms of the amount of information 
acquired. In the payoff related Welch’s t-tests round 5 also stands out in its significance, as 
evident also from Figure 1. 
 
When conducting the Welch’s t-test for the distances between the voter and the candidate 
chosen there were even more significant differences. This can be anticipated from Figure 1, 
where there is more variance in the average values of the distances, especially when compared 
to the two other variables displayed. As in the case of the information acquired, the highest 
average value is the significantly different one - round 2 is significantly different, but this time 
from rounds 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Additionally, round 4, the second highest in distance to the chosen 
candidate, is significantly different from rounds 3, 5 and 6. This is not a surprising result as 
these three rounds are the lowest paying ones.  
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It could be said that the conducted t-tests confirm what can be seen in Figure 1. The outcomes 
for payoff and information seem steadier on average for each round, whereas there is more 
variance in the distances between the voter and the chosen candidate. As the sample is small, 
it is not possible to conduct any further analysis on the relationship between the variables. 
However, with a larger sample it could be investigated how information acquisition and the 
cost considerations related, as well as the ideological distancing affect the payoff alongside 
with other variables. 
 
8.3.Treatment findings 
Different treatments were introduced to the participants to see whether behaviour would be 
altered with changed contexts when making voting choices. To recap, the treatments consisted 
of varying the initial information about a candidate (whether they had none, or the candidate 
was situated at 6 or 4 distance points from the “you” position), varying the number of 
candidates the voter could choose from (5 or 7 candidates in the election) and varying the 
electorate type (heterogenous or homogenous).  
 
In Figure 2 the three different initial information treatments are displayed. In these the initial 
information given readily to the participants is varied. The information amount here is the final 
information amount purchased by participants in the treatment. In the first graph of red bars, 
the information acquired for the rounds with initial distance of 6 is displayed. In the second 
graph, with blue bars, the acquired information amount for initial distance of 4 is displayed, 
and in the bottom graph with green bars information amount for the rounds with no initial 
information is displayed. The dashed red line in all the graphs represents the mean amount of 
information retrieved in each treatment. It should be noted that in the last graph, the information 
amount is from observations in 4 rounds, whereas in the first two, the data is from two rounds. 
This difference in observation numbers is not seen as a problem, as the aim is to look at overall 
differences. However, the results are not conclusive and should not be considered as such. 
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Figure 2. Amount of information acquired per initial distance treatment 
 
The interesting result here is that the only treatment where no information has been acquired is 
the treatment where an initial distance of 4 was given. Moreover, there is a difference in means: 
the least information was gathered in the initial distance case of 4 – 1,25, the middle amount in 
the no initial information rounds – 1,91, and the most information in the initial distance case 
of 6 – 2. The differences are not significant according to the conducted Welch’s t-test, but they 
are in line with the prediction and the existing ambiguity aversion literature – in a case of a 
positive signal it is seen that there is no need to acquire much information, and when the signal 
of the distance is negative, the perception of need to acquire information is heightened, 
although in terms of probabilities it is not rational to acquire information. 
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Figure 3. Ideological distances to the candidate chosen by initially given distance 
 
 
As the treatments with initial or no initial distancing and the type of electorate (homogenous 
or heterogenous) coincide, only information on the initial information is not enough. It is 
necessary to consider the other important variable, the distance to the chosen candidate, to see 
how it is related to the final choice made by the participant. Figure 3 shows an interesting result 
in the treatments. In the case of initial information on a candidate positioned at 6 ideological 
points from the voter, and with additional information acquired as was seen in the previous 
graph, the voters had varied distances to their chosen candidate. A similar result can be seen in 
the no initial information case where they had to purchase at least some information. However, 
in the rounds in which the voter had information about a candidate at a distance of 4, the final 
distance chosen in all the 16 cases was either 3 or 4. 
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The mean distances in the treatments show that the least ideological distances were selected 
when the participants had no initial information (2,09), a further initial distance was chosen 
when the initial known distance to a candidate was 6 (2,56) and when the voter had initial 
information on a candidate at a 4-point distance they chose on average a candidate with the 
most ideological distance to them (3,62). The Welch’s t-tests show that with this data the 
difference in average distances chosen with initial information of 4 in relation to the other two 
treatments is significant.  
 
When taking the information displayed in Figure 2 and 3 it can be seen that the treatment rounds 
with least information produced choices with further ideological distancing than the ones with 
more information. This aligns with the theory, as rational choices can only be made when the 
individual is informed enough about the candidates’ positions, especially when considering the 
treatments with initial information. With no initial information, the results do not definitely 
follow this logic, but as stated, there is a round within the treatment that might skew the results. 
 
Another treatment variation was the one in which the candidates to choose from were either 5 
or 7. Although one participant reported in the survey that they took the number of candidates 
into account, there weren’t any results pointing towards a difference in treatments. The 
averages of information acquired, ideological distanced to the candidate and payoffs were 
similar. This was thought to be the case in the prediction, as when there is no signal about the 
distribution, the candidate or party number does not matter. And the perception of difference 
did not produce differing results. However, if we look at the chosen candidates and the election 
results, there were two cases in which there was no winner by a majority of votes. Both of these 
instances occurred when there were 7 candidates involved. These results might be pure 
coincidence. However, the candidate’s success in elections is outside the scope of this thesis 
and thus this matter will not be discussed further. 
 
8.4. Within-subject results 
The design of the experiment follows a within-subject design. Therefore, some attention has to 
be given to the individual choice-making patterns of the participants and their attitudes towards 
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voting. In this section the survey responses and the results from the experiment are built to 
make voter profiles, which better explain the outcomes of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 4. Participants’ individual payoffs per round 
 
In Figure 4 the payoffs of the individual participant for all the rounds of the experiment are 
displayed. Individual results are in their separate sections with ID numbers on top, round 
numbers on the bottom x-axis and the amount of payoff on the y-axis. It can be seen that half 
of the payoffs per individual are between 3 and 8, with one participant having a payoff of 2 in 
round 8. Participants’ 8 and 9 payoffs have a narrower scope with payoffs between 3 and 5 for 
all rounds. Participant 7 stands out with consistent payoffs between 4 and 6. This participant 
reported to being mindful of their payoffs and trying to keep them above 5, which they mostly 
manage to do.  
 
As the payoffs are an outcome in the experiment, it is more interesting to look at the variables 
which contributed to this outcome. By understanding the decisions made, the utilities of voters 
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can be better understood. Therefore, in the following Figure 5 the individual information 
acquisition amounts per participant for each round are displayed. From the graph it can be seen 
that there are 3 participants (5, 8 and 9) who behaved as predicted and did not purchase any 
information when the initial information given was 4. Interestingly, half of the participants 
always purchased information, but this was not the same majority who reported to always 
looking for political information when voting. In fact, only participants 1, 2 and 6 both reported 
to always looking for information and in fact looked for it in the experiment. Participants 8 and 
9 who reported to always looking for information when voting in real life, were satisfied with 
an ideological distance of 4 in the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 5. Participants' individual information acquired per round 
 
When comparing the two initial information rounds, it can be seen that for Participant 1 there 
is no pattern of behaviour in information purchase between treatments. With participant 4 the 
amount of information purchased varied only when the number of parties was 7. Participant 7 
did purchase less information in the 4 distance treatments, than in the 6 ones. A very interesting 
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behavioural pattern can be seen in the amount of information participants 2 and 6 acquired. 
They acquired less information when the initial ideological distance was 6, and more when the 
initial distance was 4, which is opposite to the prediction.  
 
In the no information treatment all participants with the exception of Participant 7 looked for 
more information in round 6 that they did in round 5 (which was previously determined to be 
an odd one out). Otherwise there does not seem to be any pattern to the information acquisition 
in the treatment.  
 
When considering also the survey responses, it seems that the participants who were mindful 
about the amount of information they should purchase were the half that did not purchase more 
than 3 pieces of information. As stated, the frequency of search for information when voting in 
real life and the information acquisition amount here did not necessarily match. Additionally, 
no other connection was found between the survey responses and the outcomes of the 
experiment. 
 
In the survey responses some of the participants reported to certain distances being a criterion 
for their decisions. For the most part these were evident in the results of the experiment. The 
ideological distance between the candidate chosen and the “you” position of the voter for each 
round is displayed by individual participant in Figure 6. As can be seen all participants with 
the exception of Participant 9’s first round chose a candidate who was at a maximum of 5 
ideological distance points away from their own position.  
 
Participant 6 reported in their survey responses that the cap for a distance for them was 3, and 
it can be seen from Figure 6 that they kept that principle throughout the experiment. Participant 
4 also stated to have been looking for a candidate with a distance of less than 5. From their 
results it can be seen that they kept this distancing plan. Participant 8 reported to have aimed 
at 3 distance points or lower, but in their results, it is not obvious that they tried to do so. 
However, Participant 8 also stated to be unwilling to purchase a lot of information. 
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Figure 6. Participants' individual ideological distances to the chosen candidate per round 
 
An interesting result can be observed in the chosen distances, especially with participants 1, 6, 
7, 8 and 9. All these participants had their highest distance to the candidate in the initial 
information rounds. Especially with participants 1, 6, 7 and 8 the difference between the 
treatments of initial or no initial information is notable. 
 
To be able to make more accurate statements on how the individuals chose which candidate to 
vote for it is beneficial to look at the full picture. Participant 1 had the highest payoff on average 
from all their rounds (6,125). They reported to looking for best distances with the least 
information possible. Although no clear pattern can be seen from their choices, it could be seen 
that their distances were lower than the median, and the information amount was slightly higher 
than the median. Participant 2 had the lowest average payoffs (5,125) but retrieved the most 
information (2,625). Their distancing was quite varied but lower than the median (2,75). 
Additionally, in the rounds with initial information they voted for a candidate who was closer 
than the given one.  
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Participant 6 had on average the least distance (2) to the chosen candidate in all the rounds. 
This participant acquired information always, but still had close to the highest average payoff 
(6). Participant 8 had the most distance on average for all the rounds to their chosen candidate 
(3) and was one of the participants who acquired the least information (1,375) on average on 
the positions of other candidates. The participant’s payoffs were quite varied, but higher than 
the median (5,69). The other participant with low information retrieval (1,375) was participant 
4. Their distance to the candidate chosen corresponded with the median of the sample (2,75).  
 
To sum up, the overall results seem to be as predicted and as found in previous literature. 
Information does increase the payoffs from voting, but only up to a certain point. The distance 
to a candidate is important only when the ideology is of interest to the candidate, otherwise the 
individual might settle for a good enough candidate. The initial information treatments seem 
to have been the most influential to the behaviour of individuals. However, upon closer 
inspection of individual decision-making it can be observed that participants had different 
incentives for choosing the candidate they voted for.  
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9. Discussion and Future possibilities 
This chapter aims to discuss further the abovementioned results and to give suggestions for 
future developments on the voting decision-making processes in a multiparty system. In the 
discussion section the hypotheses are reflected in light of the results. Additionally, the results 
are discussed in relation to the existing literature. In the second section possibilities to improve 
the study, both in more general terms and in a context of a doctoral dissertation are discussed.  
 
9.1. Discussion 
As the aim of the thesis is to look at a multiparty system and the voting choices in it, the model 
and experiment follow a more diverse selection of information and candidates. This is what 
differentiates the study from previous studies. The pilot sample is small, but it seems to follow 
previous findings and the predictions made.  
 
The main research question in the thesis is how information acquisition and the related costs 
influence the voting choice. The main hypothesis states that information in itself will enhance 
the voting choice, whereas the related costs will affect it negatively. There is support for the 
hypothesis already in the theoretical model – the probability of the signal of the state of the 
world being correct and the probability of the knowledge about the state of the world being 
correct, as well as the ideological distancing being accurate increase with the increased amount 
of information acquired. This is further supported by the experiment findings. As described 
and seen in Figure 1, with an increased amount of information in almost all the cases, the 
payoffs are also increased. 
 
The negative effects of information acquisition costs on the utility of the voter can be seen from 
the model. The costs, relative to the amount of information acquired and the inherent skill of 
the voter, are the only variable to be deducted in the model. This observation is in line with sub 
hypothesis 1, which states that the costs are influential to the utility of the voter. The magnitude 
of this can be seen especially when we look at Participant 2’s individual outcomes in the 
experiment. The participant looked for the most amount of information but generated the 
lowest payoffs, which comes to show that there can be a point after which information becomes 
too costly. 
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This brings us to sub hypothesis 2, which states that there is a limit to information acquisition 
which is seen as the amount necessary to make a rational decision in the voting choice. As 
rationality in this thesis, and in a broader economic sense, is tightly linked to profit, it could be 
said especially in the context of the experiment that looking for information is reasonable up 
to the point when it is more likely to decrease one’s payoff by purchasing additional 
information. The overall probabilistic thresholds for looking for information are described in 
the Predictions-chapter and show that it is not advisable to look for information when one 
already has knowledge on a candidate who is at a 6-point distance, or a smaller distance, from 
the voter.  
 
Moreover, this prediction contributes to sub hypothesis 3 which states that the type of initial 
information can guide the willingness to acquire information. The costs play a considerable 
role in determining the thresholds in considerations of whether to purchase additional 
information with adding up the costs of each information piece. However, when there is 
initially available information, the voter might behave differently and not engage so eagerly in 
information acquisition, as can be seen in the participant-specific results in Figure 6. 
Nevertheless, previously known information and the previously known distances, as well as 
the individual considerations of the voter have the most influence on the final distance between 
the voter and the chosen candidate. 
 
Going back to sub hypothesis 2 – there are individual differences in thresholds of information 
which arise from personal considerations. As stated in previous literature (e.g., Brown, 1970; 
Ha & Lau, 2015; Coleman, 1988) and as modelled in the utility function, individuals have 
differing incentives when they vote. Some individuals consider ideology and policy solutions 
to be the defining features by which they choose their representative, whereas others place 
more value in personal considerations. These considerations include ingroup opinion and 
personality characteristics. This disparity in incentives is considered in the model with the 
introduction of the Ghosal and Lockwood (2009)-inspired weight variable. Although the model 
and the experiment in this thesis are centred around the ideologically bound considerations of 
the voter, it is noted that other motivators exist in defining the decisions made.  
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The difference in choice motivators is also evident in the results, as the choice patterns of 
individuals are dissimilar. However, the disparity of these participant-bound considerations is 
made even clearer through the survey responses. Some of the participants chose to create 
thresholds of distances which to follow, some were mindful of payoffs or amount of 
information acquired. Additionally, there was a mention of risk, and surely risk attitudes had 
their influence in individual choice-making, alongside with ambiguity attitudes. 
 
There could be speculation about the interest in ideological standing, or the correctness of the 
state of the world according to the voter. For example, participant 4 reported to vote only 
because they felt obliged and not for any policy or ideology-related reasons. In the experiment 
this participant was also one of the two participants to acquire the least amount of information. 
Therefore, it could be speculated that this participant votes for reasons outside the ones 
captured by this experiment. And when considering the model, their 𝜆 value (weight of personal 
considerations versus state of the world considerations) would come close to 0, making their 
utility from voting in an ideologically rational manner close to 0. However, these 
considerations are highly speculative and there is no accurate way to quantify them in this 
context. 
 
As stated, the purpose of this thesis was to conduct a pilot experiment and see whether there is 
reason to study further the impact of information and the related costs on the voting choice in 
a multiparty system. The results of this experiment seem to suggest there is a need to further 
research, especially as there is so little studies conducted in the multiparty field where 
information and options are more diverse. In the following section suggestions are made on 
how to improve this study. 
 
9.2.Future possibilities 
As the aim of the study is to look at a multiparty setting, in the future it would be interesting to 
compare two different nationalities with different political systems. As reported, there seem to 
be differences in understanding the experiment that varied with frequency of voting and 
number of candidates or parties the individual was used to in their personal voting experience. 
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Therefore, there could be two samples – for example one from Finland, with a multiparty 
system, and one from the USA, with a dual-party system – for which the experiment would be 
the same, but through which it could be seen whether the context of voting in this kind of 
decision-making setting would be different according to background and personal voting 
experiences. 
 
As the ambiguity-related behaviour is very interesting, the treatment variations could be cut to 
include only variation in initial information and distancing. Alternatively, if there would be a 
need to be more realistic in attaining information on distribution of parties alongside an 
ideological space, the number of parties could be varied, as to investigate whether there are 
effects from party or candidate numbers. In this case there could be a variation on the 
composition of the electorate. However, this kind of an investigation would require the 
inclusion of strategic behaviour, as with information on distribution and party numbers there 
would be altered preferences for voting. A new goal for the voter will form, as the chosen 
candidate’s winning an election will define their outcomes and they might not vote according 
to their true preferences, as suggested by Tyszler and Schram (2016).  
 
Most importantly, the sample size in further studies needs to be extended depending on the 
different treatments included in the investigation. With an increased observation pool, it will 
be possible to conduct more precise analysis using econometric tools like linear regression 
(more precisely, Ordinary Least Squares) to pinpoint and quantify the drivers for information 
acquisition and their relationship to the voting decision made. It would also be possible to 
investigate which factors are the most important in determining the voting behaviour with 
expanding the experiment and the survey questions. 
 
All of the abovementioned considerations will be taken into account in a doctoral dissertation, 
where the voting choice will be expanded to include a more social aspect of the voting choice. 
It is evident from this thesis that ideological or policy-related considerations cannot fully 
explain voting behaviour. As the discussed literature (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Ha & Lau, 2015) 
suggests individual considerations might overpower the economic personal considerations 
when voting decisions are formulated. It would be interesting to see whether culture and the 
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related normative behaviour and belief-systems have an influence on how individuals form 
their decisions, and whether these predetermined beliefs can be altered in light of new 
convincing information. A dissertation is a wonderful opportunity to take this thesis – its model 
and findings – and develop a more encompassing model, as well as conduct a larger scale 
experiment to attempt to better explain decision-making in a multiparty system and investigate 
the reasons and impact of information acquisition and the related costs to the utility from voting 
correctly. 
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10. Conclusions 
10.1.Introduction 
This thesis aims to take a multiparty viewpoint to the much-studied field of voting behaviour. 
The focus here is on the initial stages of voting, when the individual formulates their opinion 
on the current state of the world and their own standing on policy and ideological decisions 
and relates them to the candidates and parties running for election. The approach taken in this 
investigation is an economic and utility maximizing one. This study seeks to find how 
information acquisition and the related costs influence voting behaviour in a multiparty setting, 
and more precisely, how information and its acquisition costs influence the utility of voting; 
whether there is a threshold to information that varies by individual; and whether already 
available information has an influence on the individual’s willingness to further search for 
information on candidates’ or parties’ ideological standings. 
 
This chapter summarizes the methods applied in this thesis, as well as the findings and 
contributions made and concludes with the limitations of the current study and further 
possibilities. 
 
10.2.Main findings and contributions 
To answer the research questions of the thesis, a mathematical model and experiment are 
designed. Thus, not only a theoretical answer, but also empirical evidence in support of the 
hypotheses is given. The mathematical model derives from the works of Triossi (2013) and 
Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) and shows how an ideologically rational voting choice is made. 
Information is seen as an important part of the equation because it influences many of the other 
variables, especially the probabilities of the state of the world and the signals abut the state of 
the world being correct. Thus, the main research question receives an answer and the 
hypothesis is proven to hold, at least in theory. 
 
Through the mathematical model it is concluded that information itself has a positive 
contribution to the gains from voting as it enhances the individual’s knowledge not only about 
the state of the world and the alternatives available, but also about candidate positions, which 
helps them choose the best ideologically suited candidate. However, it is also shown that 
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information acquisition costs have a notable negative impact on the utility from voting as they 
are deducted from the gains from voting for a specific candidate. This theoretically confirms 
sub hypothesis 1 and brings out the question whether there is a balance point with information 
acquisition where maximum gains are retrieved with minimal incurring costs. 
 
As Downs (1957) stated, as long as the gains are higher than the costs it will be rational to 
acquire information to make a better voting choice. This is mathematically expressed through 
the optimal amount of information acquired and theoretically confirms sub hypothesis 2 and 3. 
Sub hypothesis 3 receives further theoretical confirmation in the Predictions-chapter. However, 
the most definitive answers to it are found in the experiment, as it is shown that some 
individuals behave differently due to their personal predispositions towards the received signals 
on the ideological proximity of a candidate. 
 
The pilot experiment, especially through the comparison of individual decision-making 
patterns, confirms the hypotheses stated to answer the research questions. Even though the 
results are not definitive due to the experiment being a small sample sized pilot, some 
consistencies with the literature can be found. Through a comparison of average information 
acquisition, distances to the candidate chosen and payoffs per round in Figure 1, it was seen 
that payoffs do increase with increase in information, which is in line with sub hypothesis 1 
and the literature (e.g. Martinelli, 2007). From the survey answers it was seen that many were 
mindful of the costs of information acquisition and therefore did not choose to acquire 
information after a certain “good enough” information piece was retrieved. This evidence, 
together with a specific individual example of participant 2’s high overall information retrieval 
numbers and low average payoffs suggest that there is a threshold for acquiring information, 
which may vary from one voter to the other.  
 
Finally, the results of the experiment showed that contrary to the probabilistically rational 
choices, there was a difference of signalling in the initial distance treatments where the 
individual had information on one candidate’s proximity to them. Only when the ideological 
distance was stated to be 4-points did the voters choose not to look for information, even though 
they shouldn’t have in either of the cases if probabilities were to be consulted. This behaviour 
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confirms sub hypothesis 3. Additionally, as there was no information available to the voters on 
candidate distribution along the ideological axis, the results are in line with previous findings 
on ambiguity aversion literature (e.g. Fox &Tversky, 1995; Atanassi et al., 2014). 
 
Overall, this thesis investigated the little studied field of decision-making in a multiparty 
system, where there is more information and choice available. Although the results align 
largely with the findings of previous research in two-party systems, because of the increased 
amount of information it is harder and costlier to stay fully informed. Therefore, the voters rely 
more heavily on signals they already possess, which brings about other than economic rational 
incentives to vote.  
 
10.3.Limitations 
Generally, even though there seems to be evidence to back some of the theory, the findings 
from the pilot experiment are not conclusive. The biggest consideration is that the sample size 
is very small. That is why the experiment is considered as a pilot, the purpose of which is to 
examine whether the approach to the issue is valid. Next, there is a treatment introduced of a 
heterogenous or homogenous electorate which did not contribute much to the results, as it 
overlapped with the initial information treatments. The electorate treatment could have had 
more effect if the participants were informed about the different treatments and their outcomes 
were dependent on their preferred candidate being elected. However, that could have brought 
in some strategic considerations and affect the ambiguity-related behaviour. The ambiguity 
could be lessened with information on distribution, which would bring more meaning also to 
the different number of candidates available in the different treatments. Overall, it could be 
said that although there were three different treatments only one seemed to have influence on 
behaviour due to the experiment design. However, the current design does increase ambiguity-
related behaviour. 
 
Additionally, there are some asymmetries in the sample. The observation points in the 
treatment with no information are more in number, and even this number is not enough to draw 
generally acceptable conclusions from. In hindsight it would have been enough to have only 2 
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rounds for the no information treatment in which the party numbers would have differed to 
make the observations equal, especially as the party size treatment was not that influential.  
 
Even though there are limitations due to the narrow scope of the study and the design of the 
pilot experiment, this thesis lays the grounds for a further, more detailed study into the initial 
stages of decision-making not only in the field of voting, but also other relatable fields where 
there is a multitude of choices from which to select the best suited, rational option. 
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Appendix 1 – Experiment instructions and practise round 
Experiment instructions 
Thank you for participating in the experiment! Your answers will be anonymous, and 
the results will be analysed and used for completing a Master’s thesis. At the end of 
the experiment one of the rounds will be selected at random and one participant, 
again selected at random, will receive their earnings in cash, the rest will receive their 
earnings in chocolate.  
 
In this experiment you will play a practise round and 8 actual rounds. In each round 
you will be asked to vote for one candidate. To vote for the candidate please write 
clearly the letter of the candidate in the designated space. 
 
You will be given your own position and one candidate’s position on an ideological 
axis. The unique ideological distance value between you and the candidate is given 
under the line. The maximum distance between you and a candidate can be 10, and 
the minimum – 1. You have the opportunity to purchase additional information about 
other candidates’ positions at the cost of 1€ per information piece. The additional 
information is inside the envelopes. If you open an envelope you must count it as 
information purchased.  
 
Your payoffs for each round are calculated using the following equation: 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌) 
where X is the distance value between you and the chosen candidate and Y is the 
amount of information you retrieved. Remember to calculate your earnings for each 
round and transfer your payoff amount on the payoff slip. 
 
After completing all the rounds, please fill in the survey. 
 
 
 
Practise round 
You are given your position and the position of all six candidates on an ideological 
axis. Please circle the candidate you choose to vote for and calculate your payoff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your payoff 
Formula:                 
X = the ideological distance 
Y = the amount of information retrieved 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌) 
 
(10 -      ) – (1 x      ) = _______________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
D B G C You 
1 
E F 
4 
2 5 
7 
10 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Example of a round with initial distance 6 (5 parties 
treatment) and additional information 
 
      Participant ID:______________ 
Your ideological axis 
 
 
 
 
 
There are altogether 5 parties in this election – B, C, D, E and F. Please vote for one 
of these below. 
 
 
Your vote   
 
 
Your payoff 
Formula:                 
X = the ideological distance 
Y = the amount of information retrieved 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌) 
 
(10 -      ) – (1 x      ) = _______________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
C You 
6 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
E You 
2 
B You 
9 
D You 
4 
F You 
5 
  
Appendix 3 – Example of around with initial distance 4 (7 parties 
treatment) and additional information 
 
       Participant ID:______________ 
Your ideological axis 
 
 
 
 
 
There are altogether 7 parties in this election – B, C, D, E, F, G and H. Please vote 
for one of these below. 
 
 
Your vote   
 
 
Your payoff 
Formula:                 
X = the ideological distance 
Y = the amount of information retrieved 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌) 
 
(10 -      ) – (1 x      ) = _______________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
You C 
4 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
D You 
10 
G You 
3 
B You 
8 
F You 
5 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E You 
6 
H You 
1 
  
Appendix 4 – Example of a round with no initial distance information 
(5 parties treatment) and the additional information 
 
Participant ID:______________ 
Your ideological axis 
 
 
 
 
There are altogether 5 parties in this election – B, C, D, E and F. Please vote for one 
of these below. 
 
 
Your vote   
 
 
Your payoff 
Formula:                 
X = the ideological distance 
Y = the amount of information retrieved 
(10 − 𝑋) − (1 𝑥 𝑌) 
 
(10 -      ) – (1 x      ) = _______________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
You 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
B You 
9 
C You 
6 
D You 
1 
E You 
7 
 
 
Ideological axis (additional information) 
 
 
 
 
 
F You 
4 
 
 
Appendix 5 – Survey 
       Participant ID:_______________ 
Survey 
Please fill in the spaces or select the correct option. 
1. Your age 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Gender 
a. Female 
b. Male 
c. Other / do not want to specify 
 
3. Home country 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Level of current studies 
a. Bachelor 
b. Master 
c. PhD 
d. Exchange student 
e. Not a student 
 
5. Study programme (if relevant) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In this experiment, how did you play? What motivated the choices you made? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. How often do you usually vote in political elections 
a. Always when possible 
b. Sometimes when the election interests me (specify your interest) 
__________________________________________________________ 
c. Never 
d. I cannot vote 
e. Other (specify) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you search for information about parties or candidates 
a. Yes, every time I vote 
b. Yes, sometimes when I vote 
c. No, never when I vote 
d. No, I don’t vote 
e. Other (specify) 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Where do you get your political information from 
a. Media (traditional and social) 
b. Friends and family 
c. I search for information on the Internet 
d. I speak with political experts and candidates 
e. I don’t need information 
f. Other (specify) 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Payoff Slip 
       Participant ID: ________________ 
Payoff Slip 
 
Round Payoff 
Practise round  
Round 1  
Round 2  
Round 3  
Round 4  
Round 5  
Round 6  
Round 7  
Round 8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Age Female Country StudyLvl StudyProgr Motivation VoteFreq InfoFreq InfoSource Practice Party1 Pay1 Info1 Dist1 Vote1 Party2 Pay2 Info2 Dist2 Vote2 Party3 Pay3 Info3 Dist3 Vote3 Party4 Pay4 Info4 Dist4 Vote4 Party5 Pay5 Info5 Dist5 Vote5 Party6 Pay6 Info6 Dist6 Vote6 Party7 Pay7 Info7 Dist7 Vote7 Party8 Pay8 Info8 Dist8 Vote8
1 32 1 Finland 1
Tried to get the best information for as little 
money spent as possible Think got pretty lucky 
most of the time, tried to be happy with 
anything over 5.
1 1 3
9 5 3 3 4 D 5 5 1 4 C 7 8 1 1 B 7 5 2 3 G 5 8 1 1 C 5 6 3 1 D 7 7 2 1 C 7 7 1 2 G
2 20 1 Spain 4
Tried to choose the greatest number but taking 
the least risk possible
1 1 1,2,3
8 5 5 3 4 D 5 3 4 3 B 7 8 1 1 B 7 4 3 3 G 5 7 2 1 C 5 4 4 2 D 7 8 1 1 C 7 2 3 5 F
4 21 1 Japan 4
Didn't expect getting a candidate with nearest 
position. Instead tried to find someone who is 
nearer than 5. Tried not to open more than 3 
envelopes.
5 2 1,2
8 5 7 1 2 E 5 5 1 4 C 7 8 2 1 B 7 6 0 4 C 5 6 1 3 B 5 6 2 2 B 7 7 1 2 D 7 3 3 4 E
5 21 1 Korea 4 Education
Considered the numer of candidates(5 or 7) and 
also thought no one can exactly have the same 
opinion with self. So just usually made a 
desicion right away iif already knew he first 
candidate was under 4
1 2 1
9 5 4 4 2 E 5 6 0 4 C 7 3 3 4 F 7 6 0 4 C 5 8 1 1 C 5 7 2 1 D 7 3 2 5 H 7 8 1 1 D
6 22 1 Korea 4
If got 1-3 chose it right away. If got higher than 
3, opened another envelope until got an okay 
number
2 1 1,3
6 5 7 1 2 E 5 3 4 3 B 7 7 1 2 E 7 4 3 3 G 5 8 1 1 C 5 7 1 2 D 7 5 4 1 C 7 7 1 2 D
7 20 1 China 1
Try to maintain the payoff more than 5. No idea 
about the motivation, maybe want to earn at 
the average level.
2 2 1,3
6 5 5 3 2 E 5 5 1 4 C 7 6 2 2 E 7 6 1 3 G 5 6 1 3 E 5 6 1 3 E 7 4 4 2 C 7 5 2 3 E
8 25 1 Finland 2
Lifelong 
learning and 
education
If the first candidate or clue was 3 or lower 
chose it. Tried not to take many clues
1 1 1,2,3
9 5 7 1 2 E 5 6 0 4 C 7 3 3 5 D 7 6 0 4 C 5 7 1 2 D 5 6 2 2 B 7 6 1 3 B 7 5 3 2 B
9 27 0 Finland 1
Lifelong 
learning and 
education
Tried to use as few tips as possible but still 
wanted to get closer than 5.
1 1 1,2,3
9 5 3 1 6 C 5 6 0 4 C 7 7 2 1 B 7 6 0 4 C 5 7 2 1 C 5 6 3 1 D 7 4 2 4 E 7 6 2 2 G
Appendix 7 – Results 
Survey and round-specific data 
 
 
Averages of payoff, information acquired and ideological distance to the chosen 
candidate 
 
 
 
 
Results by initial distance information 
 
 
  
Round Treatment Averages Info Dist
1 1 5.125 2.125 3
2 1 4.875 1.375 3.75
3 1 6.25 1.875 2.125
4 1 5.375 1.125 3.5
5 1 7.125 1.25 1.625
6 1 6 2.25 1.75
7 1 5.5 2.125 2.375
8 1 5.375 2 2.625
ID Party1 InitDist1 Pay1 Info1 Dist1 Vote1 Party2 InitDist2 Pay2 Info2 Dist2 Vote2 Party5 Dist5 Pay5 Info5 Dist5 Vote5
1 5 6 3 3 4 D 5 4 5 1 4 C 5 0 8 1 1 C
2 5 6 5 3 4 D 5 4 3 4 3 B 5 0 7 2 1 C
4 5 6 7 1 2 E 5 4 5 1 4 C 5 0 6 1 3 B
5 5 6 4 4 2 E 5 4 6 0 4 C 5 0 8 1 1 C
6 5 6 7 1 2 E 5 4 3 4 3 B 5 0 8 1 1 C
7 5 6 5 3 2 E 5 4 5 1 4 C 5 0 6 1 3 E
8 5 6 7 1 2 E 5 4 6 0 4 C 5 0 7 1 2 D
9 5 6 3 1 6 C 5 4 6 0 4 C 5 0 7 2 1 C
11 7 6 8 1 1 B 7 4 5 2 3 G 7 0 7 1 2 G
12 7 6 8 1 1 B 7 4 4 3 3 G 7 0 2 3 5 F
14 7 6 8 2 1 B 7 4 6 0 4 C 7 0 3 3 4 E
15 7 6 3 3 4 F 7 4 6 0 4 C 7 0 8 1 1 D
16 7 6 7 1 2 E 7 4 4 3 3 G 7 0 7 1 2 D
17 7 6 6 2 2 E 7 4 6 1 3 G 7 0 5 2 3 E
18 7 6 3 3 5 D 7 4 6 0 4 C 7 0 5 3 2 B
19 7 6 7 2 1 B 7 4 6 0 4 C 7 0 6 2 2 G
21 5 0 6 3 1 D
22 5 0 4 4 2 D
24 5 0 6 2 2 B
25 5 0 7 2 1 D
26 5 0 7 1 2 D
27 5 0 6 1 3 E
28 5 0 6 2 2 B
29 5 0 6 3 1 D
31 7 0 7 2 1 C
32 7 0 8 1 1 C
34 7 0 7 1 2 D
35 7 0 3 2 5 H
36 7 0 5 4 1 C
37 7 0 4 4 2 C
38 7 0 6 1 3 B
39 7 0 4 2 4 E
 
 
Interaction 
between 
information 
retrieved Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Interaction 
between 
distances to 
candidate chosen Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Interaction 
between payoffs
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
 Round 1
t = 1.0121, 
df = 12.895, 
p-value = 
0.3301
t = 0.4714, 
df = 12.226, 
p-value = 
0.6457
t = 1.5355, 
df = 13.901, 
p-value = 
0.1471
t = 1.8614, 
df = 8.895, p-
value = 0.096
t = -0.21822, 
df = 13.543, 
p-value = 
0.8305
t = 0, df = 
14, p-value = 
1
t = 0.22771, 
df = 12.922, 
p-value = 
0.8234
Round 1
t = -1.3416, 
df = 8.3011, 
p-value = 
0.2153
t = 1.142, df 
= 13.99, p-
value = 
0.2726
t = -0.88192, 
df = 8.7231, 
p-value = 
0.4015
t = 2.2, df 
= 11.53, p-
value = 
0.04901
t = 2.1183, 
df = 9.9226, 
p-value = 
0.06041
t = 0.82842, 
df = 14, p-
value = 
0.4213
t = 
0.53152, 
df = 13.7, 
p-value = 
0.6036
Round 1
t = 0.33202, 
df = 12.737, 
p-value = 
0.7453
t = -1.1633, 
df = 13.447, p-
value = 0.2649
t = -0.36172, df 
= 10.651, p-value 
= 0.7246
t = -2.9494, df 
= 10.1, p-value 
= 0.0144
t = -1.2631, 
df = 10.717, 
p-value = 
0.2334
t = -0.42857, df 
= 13.99, p-value 
= 0.6748
t = -0.26261, df 
= 13.573, p-value 
= 0.7968
Round 2
t = -0.7521, 
df = 10.239, 
p-value = 
0.4689
t = 0.32691, 
df = 13.388, 
p-value = 
0.7488
t = 0.20233, 
df = 8.0506, 
p-value = 
0.8447
t = -1.2515, 
df = 11.624, 
p-value = 
0.2354
t = -1.0121, 
df = 12.895, 
p-value = 
0.3301
t = -
0.91946, df 
= 10.873, p-
value = 
0.3778
Round 2
t = 2.8368, 
df = 8.2347, 
p-value = 
0.02129
t = 1, df = 
13.72, p-
value = 
0.3346
t = 5.8556, 
df = 10.356, 
p-value = 
0.0001397
t = 6.6933, 
df = 12.069, 
p-value = 
2.155e-05
t = 2.4685, 
df = 8.3111, 
p-value = 
0.03773
t = 2.302, 
df = 
8.7406, p-
value = 
0.04767
Round 2
t = -1.5807, 
df = 11.319, p-
value = 0.1415
t = -0.91423, df 
= 12.855, p-value 
= 0.3774
t = -4.2426, df 
= 12.226, p-
value = 
0.001097
t = -2.0494, 
df = 12.922, 
p-value = 
0.06129
t = -0.81572, df 
= 12.561, p-
value = 0.4299
t = -0.58614, df 
= 11.5, p-value = 
0.5691
Round 3
t = 1.3322, 
df = 11.636, 
p-value = 
0.2083
t = 1.8524, 
df = 10.935, 
p-value = 
0.09113
t = -0.79772, 
df = 13.397, 
p-value = 
0.4389
t = -0.4714, 
df = 12.226, 
p-value = 
0.6457
t = -
0.28365, df 
= 13.852, p-
value = 
0.7809
Round 3
t = -2.3684, 
df = 8.6363, 
p-value = 
0.04314
t = 0.78446, 
df = 11.347, 
p-value = 
0.4488
t = 0.62169, 
df = 9.7839, 
p-value = 
0.5484
t = -
0.32691, df 
= 13.987, p-
value = 
0.7486
t = -
0.69782, 
df = 
13.589, p-
value = 
0.4971
Round 3
t = 1.0711, df = 
9.5233, p-value = 
0.3105
t = -1.0857, df 
= 9.116, p-
value = 0.3055
t = 0.30551, 
df = 9.5733, 
p-value = 
0.7665
t = 0.76732, df 
= 13.572, p-
value = 0.456
t = 0.83581, df = 
13.99, p-value = 
0.4173
Round 4
t = -0.24672, 
df = 8.6092, 
p-value = 
0.8109
t = -1.8651, 
df = 13.089, 
p-value = 
0.08474
t = -1.5355, 
df = 13.901, 
p-value = 
0.1471
t = -1.5072, 
df = 12.36, 
p-value = 
0.1569
Round 4
t = 5, df = 
11.271, p-
value = 
0.0003739
t = 5.5841, 
df = 13.031, 
p-value = 
8.783e-05
t = 1.9912, 
df = 8.7362, 
p-value = 
0.0786
t = 
1.7579, df 
= 9.2929, 
p-value = 
0.1116
Round 4
t = -3.9942, df 
= 13.88, p-
value = 
0.001353
t = -1.3572, 
df = 13.998, 
p-value = 
0.1962
t = -0.17717, df 
= 10.49, p-value 
= 0.8627
t = 0, df = 
9.6506, p-value = 
1
Round 5
t = -2.4944, 
df = 9.6923, 
p-value = 
0.03244
t = -1.8614, 
df = 8.895, p-
value = 0.096
t = -2.0494, 
df = 10.294, 
p-value = 
0.06678
Round 5
t = -0.30551, 
df = 13.156, 
p-value = 
0.7648
t = -1.2034, 
df = 11.557, 
p-value = 
0.2529
t = -
1.7762, df 
= 12.564, 
p-value = 
0.0999
Round 5
t = 2.5529, 
df = 13.852, 
p-value = 
0.02314
t = 2.3457, df = 
9.9571, p-value 
= 0.04104
t = 2.2215, df = 
9.2253, p-value = 
0.05273
Round 6
t = 0.21822, 
df = 13.543, 
p-value = 
0.8305
t = 0.50918, 
df = 13.829, 
p-value = 
0.6187
Round 6
t = -1.0626, 
df = 9.9435, 
p-value = 
0.3131
t = -
1.6699, df 
= 10.797, 
p-value = 
0.1236
Round 6
t = 0.70711, df 
= 10.554, p-
value = 0.4948
t = 0.78087, df = 
9.7027, p-value = 
0.4535
Round 7
t = 0.22771, 
df = 12.922, 
p-value = 
0.8234
Round 7
t = -
0.35514, 
df = 
13.715, p-
value = 
0.7279
Round 7
t = 0.12987, df = 
13.685, p-value = 
0.8986
Differences 
between initial 
distance-
treatments
Initial distance 
4
No initial 
distance
Differences 
between initial 
distance-
treatments Initial distance 4
No initial 
distance
Differences 
between initial 
distance-
treatments
Initial distance 
4 No initial distance
Initial distance 6
t = 1.6599, 
df = 26.777, 
p-value = 
0.1086
t = 0.30004, 
df = 29.13, 
p-value = 
0.7663
Initial distance 6
t = -2.6128, df = 
18.097, p-value 
= 0.01757
t = 1.0675, 
df = 23.911, 
p-value = 
0.2964 Initial distance 6
t = 1.005, 
df = 23.463, 
p-value = 
0.3252
t = -0.5542, 
df = 25.161, p-
value = 0.5843
Initial distance 4
t = -1.5989, 
df = 21.978, 
p-value = 
0.1241
Initial distance 4
t = 6.3208, 
df = 45.262, 
p-value = 
1.018e-07 Initial distance 4
t = -2.24, df 
= 41.275, p-
value = 
0.03054
Differences 
between party 
number-
treatments
7-party 
treatment
Differences 
between party 
number-
treatments
7-party 
treatment
Differences 
between party 
number-
treatments
7-party 
treatment
5-party treatment
t = -
0.10646, df 
= 61.64, p-
value = 
0.9156 5-party treatment
t = -0.38027, df = 
61.943, p-value 
= 0.705 5-party treatment
t = 0.38789, 
df = 60.42, 
p-value = 
0.6995
Appendix 8 – Welch’s t-test results 
 
 
